Detachment 101: a microcosm of the evolutionary nature of warfare. by Withers, Kristine
  
 
 
 
DETACHMANT 101: A MICROCOSM OF THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF 
WARFARE 
 
 
by 
 
 
KRISTINE WITHERS 
 
 
 
B.A., City University of New York, 2007. 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
Department of History  
College of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2011 
 
Approved by: 
 
Major Professor 
Dr. Mark P. Parillo 
  
 
Copyright 
KRISTINE WITHERS 
2011 
 
  
 
Abstract 
The question as to the nature of war, whether evolutionary or revolutionary, as been a 
subject of some debate since William S. Lind and his associates introduced the concept of Fourth 
Generation Warfare in 1989. The adaptive and evolutional nature of warfare is demonstrative in 
an examination of Detachment 101. Detachment 101 was initially a small American clandestine 
unit assigned to South-East Asia during World War II, under the auspices of the Office of 
Strategic Services, which morphed into a combat unit that greatly aided the Allied advance into 
Burma. The objectives of this paper are twofold. The first is to show how the Americans 
successfully adapted and evolved tactics and strategies to use the military potential of the 
stateless people in Burma, in particular the Kachin people, against the Japanese during the 
Second World War. In particular, this paper will show the evolution and adaptation to battle-area 
needs by the detachment, and the importance of addressing humanitarian concerns when 
operating with indigenous units. The second goal is to examine the nature of combat in Burma as 
conducted by Detachment 101, to demonstrate the evolutional nature of warfare. This is 
especially true when one looks at combat in Burma in the light of the concepts and doctrine of 
non-linear combat in non-contiguous combat area that have developed and are known has Fourth 
Generation Warfare (4GW). This paper will show how the actions of the Detachment provided a 
template for successful non-linear military operations in a non-contiguous battlefield in 
conjunction with indigenous personnel, by presaging and developing 4GW concepts, for future 
military operations in non-contiguous battle areas. 
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Introduction 
Whether war is evolutionary or revolutionary has been a subject of some debate since 
William S. Lind and his associates introduced the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare in 1989. 
The revolutionary paradigm in studying war had been the traditional approach in examining the 
evolution of warfare among military historians. Accepting the revolutionary nature of war would 
seem consistent with empirical observation, because clearly the ability to field nuclear weapons, 
as much has the machine gun during the late nineteenth century, changed military strategies and 
tactics. The same could hold true with the introduction of gunpowder, steam power, 
fortifications, or the longbow. Nevertheless, for something to be revolutionary it needs to be an 
action or innovation that is outside and beyond established procedures or concepts. While it is 
true that the technological means of extending force over, and therefore ultimately defeating, the 
enemy evolved and grew more lethal through revolutionary innovations, the ultimate goal in 
warfare has not changed. The ultimate aim of warfare, defeating an enemy by achieving 
economic and combat supremacy while obtaining, or coercing, popular support of the indigenous 
population, remains constant. The ability to wage war by revolutionary means, while 
simultaneously attaining the traditional martial goals, would therefore lead to the conclusion that 
the nature of war is evolutionary and adaptive rather than revolutionary. The adaptive and 
evolutional nature of warfare is demonstrative in an examination of Detachment 101.       
Detachment 101 was an American clandestine unit assigned to South East Asia during 
World War II. Many ethnic groups in South East Asia were anti-colonialist before the onset of 
the Second World War. When the Japanese invaded South East Asia in 1941, much of the native 
population saw the Japanese as liberators. Some ethnic groups continued to aid the Japanese for 
most of the war, but other groups felt that the Japanese occupation was oppressive and actively 
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offered aid to the Allies. Japanese and Allied forces used indigenous ethnic groups‟ feuds, 
cultural attributes, manpower, supplies, and knowledge of the terrain to attain their strategic and 
tactical objectives. This was especially true in Burma. The river valleys, rugged mountains, 
monsoons, and dense jungle vegetation of Burma made conventional linear combat extremely 
difficult. Both sides relied greatly on the few roads and railroads to transport troops and supplies 
to the conventional Indian and Chinese fronts, and these routes were highly vulnerable to 
military operations. To operate in this difficult terrain, assistance from the indigenous peoples 
was essential. There has been little historical study on the military value, utilization, and strategic 
effectiveness of the indigenous Burmese people in Allied military operations in the China-
Burma-India Theater(CBI) neither during the Second World War nor on the development of 
viable non-linear strategies and tactics in a non-contiguous battle area. 
The occupation of Burma was of strategic importance to the Japanese and Allies, because 
of its strategic position. For Japan, the occupation of Burma was essential to solidifying their 
control over South East Asia. Japan began its battle for Japan in 1931 with its takeover of 
Manchuria; by 1941, they had practically isolated China from the rest of the world. The hard-
pressed Chinese had only one source to obtain foreign supplies, the Burma Road. This supply 
line originated from Burma to the Chinese city of Kunming. Japanese occupation of Burma 
would effectively end Chinese resistance and provide a staging area for a Japanese invasion of 
India. In addition to the strategic value Burma provided Japan, Burma also provided oil, rubber, 
tin, and other natural resources. This was important to the Japanese because it was a nation of 
few natural resources. For the Allies, their strategic goals were the obverse of the Japanese. The 
Allies needed to keep the Burma Road open so that the Chinese forces could be supplied and 
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continue to remain in the war and to deny the Japanese a staging area to invade India and its 
badly needed resources. 
     
1
 
                                                 
1
 Map from David W. Hogan W. Hogan, U.S. Special Operations in World War II (Washington, 
D.C.:CMH Publications, 1992), accessed April 30, 2011, http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwII/70-
42/map9.JPG.  
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The objectives of this paper are twofold. The first is to show how the Americans 
successfully adapted and evolved tactics and strategies to use the military potential of the 
stateless people in Burma, in particular the Kachin people, against the Japanese during the 
Second World War. In particular, this paper will show the evolution and adaptation to battle-area 
needs by the detachment and the importance of addressing humanitarian concerns when 
operating with indigenous units. The second goal is to examine the nature of combat in Burma as 
conducted by Detachment 101 to demonstrate the evolutional nature of warfare. This is 
especially true when one looks at combat in Burma in the light of the concepts and doctrine of 
non-linear combat in non-contiguous combat area that have developed and are known as Fourth 
Generation Warfare (4GW). The ability of Detachment 101 to conduct non-linear combat 
operations in a non-contiguous battle theater was possible because of technological advances and 
adaptations to fighting in terrain that mandated non-linear tactics in a non-contiguous battle area. 
As with most new military concepts, contemporary participants misunderstood the concept and 
nature of non-linear combat in the non-contiguous battle area and classified the detachment‟s 
military operations in the theater simplistically as “guerrilla.” To term the detachment‟s 
operation as simply “guerrilla,” even though the detachment went through a “guerilla” 
operational phase, is too restrictive, given its evolutionary nature. This paper will show how the 
actions of the Detachment provided a template for successful non-linear military operations in a 
non-contiguous battlefield in conjunction with indigenous personnel, by presaging and 
developing 4GW concepts, for future military operations in non-contiguous battle areas.  
Studies that examine the operations of the Chindits mention the use of the Kachin people 
in military operation by the Allies, but only in passing and dismissively. The Chindits were a 
British unit formed and led by Major General Orde Wingate in 1942. The Chindits were a “long-
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range penetration” force that infiltrated Japanese lines in North Burma during the war, and their 
operations were commando in nature. For many months, they lived and fought the enemy in the 
jungles of Japanese-occupied Burma, relying totally on airdrops for their supplies. Studies 
characterize the Kachins contributing to the Chindits‟ military operations as laborers or guides or 
as British levy troops attached to Chindit operations in support positions. The Chindits had a 
detachment of indigenous people, composed mainly of the Kachins, operating under their 
command. The Kachins‟ place in the organization, actions, use in the tactical operation, and 
overall effect on the outcome of battle, while mentioned, are not the focus of the studies of 
Chindit operations.  This is the case in the works of Nathan N. Prefer‟s Vinegar Joe’s War: 
Stilwell’s Campaign in Burma, David Roone‟s Mad Mike: A Life of Brigadier Michael Calvert 
and Wingate and Chindits: Redressing the Balance, and Trevor Royle‟s Orde Wingate: Irregular 
Soldier.
2
  
The 5307 Composite Unit, better known has “Merrill‟s Marauders,” is also the focus of 
many historical narratives examining operations in Burma. The unit operated under the 
codename Galahad and owed its inception on the perceived strategic success of Wingate‟s 
Chindits.  The 5307
th
 also had substantial Kachin elements attached to it, which grew as the 
5307
th„s operations proceeded. The Kachins‟ role in the historical works that examine the 5307th 
operations, though recognized, is underplayed.  The Marauders, by Charlton Osborne, is 
generous in its praise of the Kachin people who aided the Allies. Osborne cogently contends that 
the indigenous people deserved more credit for their part in the eventual Allied victory in Burma 
                                                 
2
 Nathan N Prefer, Vinegar Joe’s War: Stilwell’s Campaign in Burma (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000.), 
David Roone, Mad Mike: A Life of Brigadier Michael Calvert and Wingate and Chindits: Redressing the Balance 
(Barnsley, U.K.: Pen and Sword Books, 2007), and Trevor Royle, Orde Wingate: Irregular Soldier (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995).   
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than presented in his work. Charles N. Hunter‟s Galahad and James E. T. Hopkins and John M. 
Jones‟ Spearhead: A Complete History of Merrill’s Marauder Rangers focus on the Americans‟ 
privations and difficulties with jungle warfare and barely examine the indigenous people‟s role 
in Detachment 101 in the 5307
th‟s combat operations.3 The indigenous people‟s support, when 
acknowledged, appears paternalistic and is plainly apparent. The studies examining the Kachin 
people‟s contribution to military operations and organization and their importance to the overall 
success of military operations in the theater is lacking. This is the case in John Kennedy Ohl‟s 
Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII and Louis Allen‟s 
Burma, the Longest War.
4
 Other scholars‟ work focuses on General Joseph Stilwell‟s military 
leadership in the CBI Theater and barely acknowledges the indigenous people‟s helpfulness in 
the war effort as laborers or guides. Of those narratives, Charles F. Romanus and Riley 
Sunderland, United States Army in World War II , China-Burma-India Theater, I:  Stilwell’s 
Mission to China and II:  Stilwell’s command Problems, and III: Time Runs Out in the CBI are 
prime examples. Barbara Tuchman, in her Pulitzer Prize winning Stilwell and the American 
Experience in China, 1911 – 1945, built her history of the Burma Theater around Stilwell‟s 
experiences.
5
 Tuchman‟s mentions of the Kachin are fleeting, and the Kachins are characterized 
as little more than coolie labor or guides. 
                                                 
3
 Charles N. Hunter, Galahad (San Antionio, TX: Tlie Naylor, 1963), James E.T. Hopkins and John M. 
Jones, Spearhead: A Complete History of Merrill’s Marauders Rangers (Baltimore, MD: Galahad Press, 1999), and 
Charlton Ogburn, The Marauders (New York: Harper & Row, 1959). 
4
 John Kennedy Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII (DeKalb, 
Il.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), and Louis Allen, , Burma, the Longest War (New York: St. Martins 
Press, 1984). 
5
 Charles F Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II , China-Burma-India 
Theater, I:  Stilwell’s Mission to China, II:  Stilwell’s command Problems, III: Time Runs Out in the CBI 
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Successful manipulation of ethnic conflicts and concerns among the different people of 
Burma helped the Allies achieve victory in Burma. The Burmans are the largest single ethnic 
group in Burma, comprising approximately two-thirds of Burma's population, and were initially 
receptive to the Japanese. Most of Burma's ethnic minorities inhabited areas along the country's 
mountainous frontiers. The Karen and Shan groups comprise about 10% of the population, while 
Akha, Chin, Chinese, Danu, Indian, Kachin, and other minority groups represent 5% or less of 
the population.
6
 The Kachin live in the mountainous northeast section of Burma, mainly in and 
around the valleys of the two upper branches of the Irrawaddy River and along the Chinese 
border, as well as a small number who live in Assam. The traditional occupation of the Kachins 
is farming. They used “slash and burn” techniques to clear fields and provide fertilizer and grow 
rice, the primary crop, corn, buckwheat, sesame, tobacco, and a wide variety of vegetables. The 
Kachins also hunt, fish, and breed pigs, chickens, and buffalo and/or cattle.
7
 The Kachins are 
overwhelmingly Christian, converted by missionaries at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
The number of Kachins participating with the United States military during the Second World 
War is estimated at around 8,000 to 11,000. Jinghpaw means “hill people” in the Kachin 
language, and the Kachins prefer Jinghpaw over the hated term "Kachin," which means “sour-
bitter” and was the name given to them by their traditional enemies, the Burmans.8 For the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953) and Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American 
Experience in China, 1911 – 1945(New York: Grove Press, 1970).   
6
 “CIA World Fact Book,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed on January 22, 2009, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.  
7
 Barbra West, Encyclopedia of the Peoples of the Asia and Oceania (New York: Infobase Publishing, 
2009), 355. 
8
 Shelby Tucker, Among Insurgents (New York: Macmillan, 2000), 66.  
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purposes of this paper, the term Kachin is used to describe the indigenous people recruited by 
Detachment 101 because it was the popular term employed at the time and in official documents.  
The limited transportation infrastructure and rough topographic nature of the Burmese 
theater strongly influenced the development of non-linear tactics through practical necessity. 
Detachment 101 developed strategies and tactics in response to the nature of a non-contiguous 
battle area. The non-contiguous and non-linear nature of the Second World War in Burma has 
engendered confusion about the nature of military operations by the detachment‟s military 
component and the tactical and strategic contribution the detachment made to the overall Allied 
offensive into Burma. The organization, training, recruitment, methods, and operations of the 
detachment‟s military component developed reactively to combat and strategic concerns, 
demonstrating how an intelligence unit can evolve into a military force that fights in addition to 
conducting the unit‟s primary intelligence mission.  
Allied commanders, and some members of Detachment 101, were initially unaware or 
unappreciative of the military potential of Detachment 101 in Burma. The military success and 
tactical importance of Detachment 101 makes an operational study of this unit valuable to the 
study of warfare overall. The detachment‟s success was dependent on the relationships formed 
between the Kachins and the detachment personnel. The personal relationships between an alien 
military force and the indigenous people are an important factor in this type of warfare because 
of the necessity of mutual trust in combat. Andy Knight‟s research in 4GW arrives at a similar 
conclusion. Knight notes that “winning hearts and minds” is essential to successful operations 
and “the ultimate objective of the military in such scenarios is to make the security/humanitarian 
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mission as seamless as possible.”9 To build and maintain a cohesive fighting force composed of 
indigenous people, Detachment 101 found it needed to befriend the indigenous people, gain their 
trust, and guarantee the safety and welfare of the indigenous fighter‟s dependents.  
Let us define some terms. “Guerrilla warfare” dates from the Napoleonic Wars, when the 
defeated Spanish army reorganized into small independent units capable of conducting limited 
actions; as a result, the Spanish diminutive suffix added to their word for war, guerra, resulting 
in guerrilla. Guerrilla warfare, as usually defined, occurs when irregular forces, nonprofessional 
civilian-soldiers, take up arms to fight against a professional and organized military force. 
Lieutenant Colonel George B. Jordan maintains that guerrilla warfare can also mean a phase of 
unconventional warfare conducted by indigenous forces organized on a paramilitary or military 
basis to harass and eventually defeat an enemy.
10
 The fundamental tactic employed by guerillas 
is striking and fleeing continually; there are no conventional military objectives or concentration 
of force. Mao Zedong, in his study of guerrilla warfare, maintains that the guiding principles for 
guerrilla “operations proceed without exception from one basic principle; that is, to strive as far 
as possible to preserve one‟s own strength and annihilate that of the enemy.”11 There is a 
consensus among military theorists that guerrillas must operate in areas where they have the 
support of the local population in the form of information, food, shelter, and recruits.  
In 1995, the terms “noncontiguous” and “nonlinear” were introduced into Joint 
Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. The United States Army‟s FM3-0 doctrine 
                                                 
9
 Andy Knight “Civil-military Cooperation and Human Security” in Civil-military Cooperation in Post-
conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice ed. Christopher Ankerson (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23. 
10
 Lt. Col George B. Jordan, “Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare”, in Modern 
Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin M. Osanka (New York: Glencoe Free Press, 1966), 403. 
11
 Mao Zedong, Selective Works, II. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 121. 
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manual in 2001 codified the terms. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along 
lines of operations identified as the foreword lines of one‟s own troops in linear operations; 
“emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly 
forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and security of rear areas 
guaranteed. This is especially true of the lines of communication between bases and fighting 
forces”.12 In nonlinear combat operations, military units operate in noncontiguous areas 
throughout the battle theater, known as Areas of Operations (AOs). Nonlinear operations 
typically focus on numerous decisive points in the battle theater, and units conduct multiple 
military missions, also known as lines of operations, based on geographic, strategic, or tactical 
considerations of the AOs. “Lines of communications (LOCs) often diverge from lines of 
operations, and sustaining operations may depend on supplies being moved in union with units 
or supplied by air.”13 Providing airborne supplies and coordinating units operating in different 
AOs was technologically possible during the Second World War, which meant nonlinear combat 
was viable in the Burmese theater during the war.  
4GW is a concept defined in 1989 by a team of American analysts, including William 
Lind, to describe modern warfare‟s evolution to a decentralized form. Publishing their findings 
in the Marine Corps Gazette, the authors argued that first-generation warfare is characterized by 
Napoleonic-style close-order formation of line and column. Second-generation warfare, building 
on the improvement in the firepower of industrial age weaponry, sought to achieve victory 
through attrition as exemplified by World War I-era combat. Third-generation warfare, again 
using technological advancements as a spur for evolution, is defined by emphasis on maneuver 
                                                 
12
 United States Army, FM 3-0: Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2001), 24. 
13
 Ibid. 5-11.  
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and innovative decentralized attacks.  The authors persuasively maintain that 4GW will involve 
small, highly maneuverable, independent units that do not rely on logistical or other lines of 
communications; the units will seek to achieve psychological goals as much as physical goals.
14
 
This would mean that the 4GW battle theater would be non-linear and non-contiguous and 
dependent on achieving a military victory by using means and methods beyond actual physical 
conflict with the enemy. This would include using factors such as cultural sensitivities and 
rivalries, propaganda, and economic incentives to achieve a victory. Stateless forces typically 
fight 4GW, either independently or in conjunction with outside aid from an established state, 
against a nation-state. Because of this, Jacques Heynan logically concludes that 4GW uses three 
levels of tactics to achieve victory: physical, mental, and moral. Therefore, “there may even be 
no one combatant and those smaller groups organize in impromptu alliances to target a bigger 
threat, that being the state armed forces or another faction”.15  Because of the strength 
differentials between forces, the allocation of military resources, to be maximally beneficial, 
should have an emphasis on not engaging in attritional combat. As Thomas X. Hammes notes, in 
4GW, operations “may focus not on physical destruction but on area denial or disruption.”16 The 
overall strategy of 4GW is generally attributed to Mao Zedong, but 4GW tactics and principles 
can be seen in Detachment 101 operations also.    
 
 
                                                 
14
 William Lind, et al “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 
63/3, (October, 1989), 22-26. 
15
 Jacques M.C. Heynan Murders Without Assassins (Raleigh: Lulu Books, 2008), 57. 
16
 Thomas X. Hammes The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21
st
 Century (St. Paul, MN.: MBI 
Publishing, 2006), 216. 
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Chapter 1 - The First Phase 
Detachment 101‟s companies, battalions, and brigades were dispersed in noncontiguous 
AOs, operating independently towards separate objectives, or decisive points, but with a 
common strategic purpose. Burma is ringed by high mountain ranges, particularly in the north, 
with a central plain that is dense with heavy jungle and dissected by swift rivers. The 
transportation infrastructure was extremely limited and vulnerable. All this necessitated the use 
of small troop movements. These features promoted nonlinear and non-contiguous operations, 
and the technology of the time made such operations feasible and necessitated the development 
of 4GW tactics and strategies. The airplane and radio had revolutionized military operations by 
making it possible to disperse non-linear formations around the battlefield and allowing units to 
operate independently of ground lines of communications.
17
  
The rugged topography of Burma makes the concept of nonlinear and non-contiguous 
warfare crucial in examining Detachment 101‟s military role in Burma during the Second World 
War. In jungle warfare, “linear formations are virtually impossible to maintain, since men get 
lost or stray in the underbrush, which makes compact formations essential.”18 The detachment‟s 
military units were perfect for fighting the Japanese in Burma, because of their knowledge of the 
battle area, compact formations, speed of movement, and ability to survive and fight in the jungle 
terrain. The detachment‟s military units evolved from a group of rag-tag adventurers into light 
infantry units and utilized in a far more conventional nature to fill a void in Allied planning. 
Allied planners, especially the Americans, had not foreseen the need for non-contiguous light 
                                                 
17
 This argument is made by Major John L. Atkins, RLC in A Model of Nonlinear and Noncontiguous 
Operations: The War in Burma 1943 – 1945 (Monograph United States Command and General Staff College 2003), 
but limits his conclusions to Chindits operations and Kachin Levies operations with British forces. 
18
 United States Army. FM 3-0: Jungle Warfare, 39. 
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infantry troops for reconnaissance, area denial or disruption, and seizing and holding ground for 
the main advance. The detachment filled this conventional combat need in a non-linear battle 
area and developed 4GW principles in reaction to the battle area‟s needs. 
The Forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency was the Coordinator of Information 
(COI). The COI‟s, renamed  Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in June of 1942, mission was to 
"collect and analyze all information and data which may bear upon national security, and to carry 
out such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information for national 
security not now available to the government."
19
 The OSS conducted many intelligence and 
espionage operations in many battle theaters, with varying degrees of success, but one OSS 
operation went beyond clandestine operations to conduct conventional military operations. This 
operation was in Burma and conducted by Detachment 101. The operation and unit was 
officially established in the spring of 1942, authorized under a directive from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff that authorized the OSS to conduct guerilla warfare in conjunction with, and for, the Allied 
Forces.
20
 Scholars and participants‟ accounts maintain the detachment‟s actions were guerilla in 
nature. Yet, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that Detachment 101 evolved into a 
military unit that used 4GW strategies and tactics to achieve conventional military goals while 
maintaining its espionage component.  
Detachment 101 started out with a modest force and a limited mission in what some 
considered the backwater of the Second World War. Detachment 101 was the brainchild of 
                                                 
19
 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1986), 61. 
20
 Lt. Col. W.H. Peers to Brig. Gen. W. J. Donovan, “Report covering Period 31 October to 30 November, 
1944”. Record Group 226, Entry A1-170, Box 277. Records of the Office of Strategic Services OSS, National 
Archives, Md.  
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Millard Preston Goodfellow, a former Brooklyn newspaper publisher and Boy's Club executive. 
As part of his OSS activities, he prepared staff studies for intelligence and irregular warfare 
operations in Asia. He proposed an OSS operation for Burma.
21
 Burma was low on the American 
list of priorities to allocate forces and material at the beginning of the American involvement in 
the war, because American military planners viewed it as a primarily British area of operations. 
Detachment 101 consisted of nine officers and fourteen enlisted men at the start of operations, in 
the spring of 1942, under the Command of than Major Carl Eifler.
22
 Eifler‟s role in Detachment 
101 would seemingly confirm H. Allen Holmes‟s argument that 4GW and guerilla conflicts need 
the “the right skills and right leadership” to be effective.23 In early 1941, Captain Eifler received 
a call to active duty and took command of Company K, 35th COI in Washington, D.C. General 
William J. Donovan, the commander of COI, wanted to establish a paramilitary unit in the 
China-Burma-India Theater (CBI), but the commanding general of the theater, General Joseph 
Stilwell, opposed this plan.
24
 There was already an espionage unit operating in the CBI Theater. 
Captain Milton S. Miles had arrived in May 1942 with vague orders from the Navy Department 
to undertake operations that would do maximum possible damage to the enemy. Stilwell, who 
                                                 
    
21
 Russell Francis, The Secret War (New York: Time-Life Books, 1981), 108 – 110, and Richard Dunlop Behind 
Japanese Lines. (New York: Rand McNally & Company, 1979), 89, assert this claim 
22
 Francis Russell,“OSS Detachment 101” in Ex-CBI Roundup”, October 1988 (online) http://www.cbi-
history.com/part_vi_101_oss-3.html. Accessed on 4/30/11, gives this number, James R. Ward “The Activities of 
Detachment 101 of the OSS” in The Secret War: The Office of Strategic Services in WWII (Washington D.C.: 
National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), 321 and Harve Saal “SOG” in Special Operation Association 
(Nashville: Turner Publishing, 2005, put the initial number of the detachment at 21, because it does not include 
Eifler or Couglin in the count because they were commanders. 
23
 H. Allen Holmes “Special Operations Forces as a Strategic Asset in the 21st Century” in Roles and 
Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War ed. Richard H. Schultz, Robert L. Pflatzgraff, and W. Bradley 
Stock (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997), 164.   
24
 Russell, Francis, The Secret War, 169. 
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wanted to hit back at the Japanese in some way, gave Miles free and exclusive control over all 
American intelligence and special operations in CBI.
25
  
 Donovan was stubborn and did not accede to Stillwell‟s desires. Two months later, 
Eifler, an old acquaintance from Stilwell's interwar service on the Mexican border, appeared in 
Chungking at the head of an OSS mission that Stilwell had initially rejected. Because Eifler had 
known and worked with Stilwell during the interwar period, Donovan chose Eifler to train and 
command a group of OSS saboteurs assigned to the CBI Theater.
26
 Upon his arrival, Eifler found 
that Stilwell had little inclination to use the detachment in any meaningful way. A conventional 
soldier and a passionate admirer of conventional infantry tactics, Stilwell disparaged guerrilla 
tactics as an "illegal action" and "shadow boxing.”27 Miles complicated the situation, because he 
was working under the assumption that he was in command of all Allied intelligence and special 
operations in CBI. Miles argued that he had already reached an agreement with the Chinese 
General Tai Li, Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek‟s intimidating director of internal 
security, to train 50,000 Chinese guerrillas. Alerted to detachment‟s existence by the suspicious 
Tai Li and determined to preserve his exclusive control, Miles took his case to Stilwell, who 
claimed with some irritation that the War Department had pulled a "squeeze play" on him. 
Consequently, when Eifler appeared at theater headquarters in July, Stilwell remained aloof, 
                                                 
25
 Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942, OSS History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, RG 226, National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and David W. Hogan, Jr., US Arms Special Operations in World 
War II (Washington: US Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1992), 65-68. 
26
 Eifler‟s choice as first commander of Detachment 101 is well documented in Richard Dunlop‟s Behind 
Japanese Lines. (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1979), and Peers and Brelis‟ Behind the Burma Road 
(Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1963.) 
27
 Peers and Brelis‟ Behind the Burma Road (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1963.), 48. 
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informing him, "I didn't send for you and I don't want you."
28
 This confusion was indicative of 
the lack of planning in determining the detachment‟s mission, and early operations.  
After several meetings with Eifler, Stilwell finally agreed to allow the detachment to 
operate under his command, with the mission of conducting sabotage missions in Burma. In 
September of 1942, Stilwell issued orders for the unit to start operations, and the orders limited 
the detachment exclusively to conducting sabotage operations. Stilwell sent Eifler to Burma, as 
much to keep him clear of Miles in China as for any other reason.
29
 The detachment's orders 
read: 
 The following initial specific mission is given you for immediate execution: To 
make plans for denying the use of the Myitkyina Aerodrome to the Japanese as an 
operational field. This is your primary mission. In the accomplishment of this mission, 
without any desire to restrict you, it is desired to indicate that destruction on the railroad, 
the firing of railroad cars, and the sinking of vessels carrying fuel will all contribute to 
the general success of your operations. Effective destruction of important bridges, such as 
the R.R. Bridge near Neza would reduce rail shipments of gasoline to a minimal amount. 
You should make a careful estimate of the situation and plan your action, then inform this 
headquarters of your general plan. b. Subsequent missions will be given you from time to 
time, but for these you will submit your plans for approval before executing them.
30
  
 
The detachment would go beyond the parameters of these orders because of the 
leadership and personality of Eifler, which was suited for nonlinear and non-contiguous warfare.     
The choice of Eifler can account for the initial success and survival of the detachment 
despite the detachment‟s chaotic beginnings and lack of a clear mission purpose. Eifler was not a 
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conventional military officer; he was an adventurous man who had been a Treasury agent, border 
guard, and police officer. This would help Eifler and the detachment to adapt to the Burmese 
battle area, rather than be limited by a conventional view of the unconventional battle area, and 
effectively use the detachment‟s limited allocation of manpower and supplies. Stilwell 
appreciated Eifler‟s daring nature, enthusiasm, and leadership ability. Stilwell would notice the 
burly Major, and call out, "Buffalo Bill! Come on over!" and then introduce Eifler to senior 
officers as the "Army's number one thug.”31  Stilwell‟s parting instructions for him were, “Eifler, 
I don‟t want to see you again until I hear a boom from Burma!”32 Eifler was in his early forties at 
the time of his service and presented a formidable presence. At 250 pounds, he was physically 
intimidating, and he had a gregarious personality, sharp intellect, loud voice and a love for 
adventure. Eifler was a natural leader for a unit conducting independent operations in a non-
contiguous battle area.     
The detachment‟s initial efforts were far from successful and reflected a lack of clear 
direction for the detachment. In July of 1942, Eifler recruited Captain John Coughlin, who in 
turn recruited Ray Peers, and together they recruited twenty-one handpicked enlisted personnel 
who shared Eifler‟s predilection for seeing war as an adventure.33 This was the detachment‟s 
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initial personnel as it deployed to the CBI Theater. Through personal contacts made in Calcutta, 
Eifler obtained the use of a plantation in Nazira for the detachment‟s headquarters and training 
facility. Between late December 1942 and late February 1943, four small groups of trained 
Detachment personnel, augmented by a small group of refugees from Burma, infiltrated Japanese 
lines to attempt acts of sabotage but largely failed in their mission. The only damage caused by 
the detachment was the destruction of Namkwin Bridge and parts of the rail line, at a cost of 
eighteen men. In March 1943, groups “L” in the upper Hukawng valley, “M” in the Taro Valley, 
and “J” at the junction of the Chaudan and Pangeao passes, received the  assignment to gather 
information on Japanese dispositions, strength and movement on roads and trails and to rescue 
downed Air Corps personnel.
34
 The detachment‟s failure to inflict substantive damage on the 
Japanese demonstrates the futility of trying to obtain victory in the non-contiguous battle area by 
attritional means. The focus of the detachment‟s mission had shifted from sabotage to espionage 
and rescue, which would fortuitously lead to greater contact with the indigenous people of the 
area. 
At this time, the detachment‟s unit leaders started to recruit, train, supply, and arm 
Kachins to conduct limited military, and espionage, operations against the Japanese.
35
 Members 
of the detachment formed friendships with the chiefs of the different Kachin tribes, gaining their 
trust by deferring to the Kachin societal hierarchy and customs. Barbra West‟s research shows 
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that there are two trends in the Kachin political culture; the gumsa system, where hereditary 
chiefs control the land, labor, and resources, and the gumlao system, which is similar to a 
confederacy among different chiefs.
36
  By recognizing the indigenous Kachin culture‟s political 
culture and adapting to its mores, the detachment gained more indigenous manpower. This in 
turn increased the numbers of indigenous volunteers, which allowed the detachment to take on 
more diverse and wide-ranging military missions. This is because the Kachin leaders brought 
loyal fighters, bases of operations, manual laborers, and intelligence resources to the detachment 
under an already established hierarchy conducive to military operations. The exact numbers of 
Kachin personnel recruited initially by the detachment is not available because each leader 
brought with him a different number of followers. Obtaining the aid of indigenous people in the 
battle area is an absolute necessity for success in any conflict in nonlinear, noncontiguous, or 
4GW battle area. Hy S. Rothstein logically maintains that in unconventional warfare, which 
utilizes 4GW tactics and strategies, the goal in obtaining the aid of indigenous people is to “win a 
war by working with –as opposed to neutralizing or fighting around – local populations.” To 
obtain that aid, the 4GW warrior must “win their trust… live with them, eat with them, and share 
the same living conditions”.37 This does not mean to imply the OSS did not cooperate with other 
indigenous people in other theaters of the war. Rather, the nature of the CBI Theater and extent 
of dependence on an indigenous people by the detachment was unique at the time. The 
detachment‟s operations in fighting a common enemy in a noncontiguous battle-area in 
conjunction with non-state indigenous force presaged accepted modern conceptions of 4GW 
tactics and strategies. 
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As more manpower became available, the detachment had to develop tactics and a 
strategy to effectively use and organize the increased military ranks tactically to achieve Allied 
strategic aims in the theater. Initially, the Kachin volunteers conducted traditional hit and run 
guerilla operations, but they would eventually shift their mission focus to establish secure AOs 
by occupying and holding non-contiguous territory in the Kachin hills. The establishment of 
secure and recognized AOs facilitated logistics, allowed greater coordination of operations, and 
led to the detachment‟s integration into the CBI theater hierarchy. While similar to “guerilla 
strongholds,, the detachment‟s AOs reflected zone of control linked to an established chain of 
command and logistical source. Whereas guerilla strongholds depend on the military force 
exerted by one side or the other, and the guerilla forces are supplied by the resources within 
guerilla control, in secure AOs, secure lines of supply (LOS) are linked to the controlling 
headquarters, usually by air, and their actions are coordinated with other AOs. Guerillas differ in 
that they do not normally try to set up an established base of operation or initiate operations, 
beyond hit and run operations, against the occupation force. As the detachment recruited more 
personnel who were indigenous, the detachment was able to establish more bases of operations 
behind Japanese lines. By the end of 1943, Detachment 101 had established six non-contiguous 
AOs behind Japanese lines in northern Burma, three on each side of the Irrawaddy River.
38
 The 
AOs were still modest efforts, not capable of exerting much military force projection. Each area 
commander recruited and trained a small Kachin element for his personal protection, defense of 
the AOs, and limited military operations, principally small ambushes, intelligence gathering, and 
acts of sabotage.  
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Communication between stable AOs with controlling headquarters is essential to success 
in the 4GW and non-contiguous battle-area. Stable communication allows “real-time” 
intelligence and concerns, humanitarian and tactical, to be communicated to the controlling 
headquarters. This allows for effective use of force, coordinated operations, psychological 
operations, and allocation of supplies among multiple AOs in the battle area. General Wayne A. 
Downing, based on his examination and experience in the modern 4GW battle areas, posits, 
“[S]upport teams working with American allies provide an invaluable link the national force and 
the controlling headquarters.” Downing further contends, “Cultural awareness helps their teams 
operate with foreign military contingents, and the teams organic communication systems make 
them the ideal link with the coalition headquarters”.39  This was readily apparent to the 
detachment, and they adapted. Group “Knothead” had many Kachins who had been actively 
resisting the Japanese since the Japanese invaded, and this group formed the foundation for the 
detachment‟s military assets. In May of 1943, with fifteen men and forty-five porters, Captain 
Vincent Curl marched from Fort Hertz to the western slopes of the Hukawng Valley. His mission 
was to “block the trails leading from the Hukawng Valley into the hills, so that the enemy could 
not establish positions in the heights, and confined to the valley proper”.40 Curl's unit maintained 
contact with the detachment‟s headquarters via airdrops and radio, thereby forming an 
independent AO working in conjunction with the main Allied headquarters.  
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Vince Curl was regular Army, having been a sergeant in Company K, 35
th
 Infantry, 
where he attracted the attention of Eifler. Curl and Eifler, because of their similar personalities, 
formed a close friendship. Colonel John Coughlin, a West Point graduate who was also in the 
35
th
 Infantry and recruited by Eifler for duty with the detachment, said that Curl would “gladly 
have killed for Carl Eifler.”41 Because of this close friendship, and Eifler‟s proclivity for 
audacious actions by his subordinates, Curl had wide latitude to operate his group. It is possible 
that Curl suggested his operational group's mission to Eifler because of his conventional 
conception and training in jungle warfare. In the standard jungle warfare training given to 
American service members, it was conventional teaching to secure the aid of the native 
population in military operations.
42
 It is possible, though far from certain, that Curl looked for 
organized native resistance forces to use in theater because of his military training. Curl knew 
from Red Maddox, an Anglo-Burmese native attached to the detachment, of a rag-tag Kachin 
resistance group with Zhing Htaw Naw as duwa (leader) in the western hills of the Hukawng 
Valley that had kept the Japanese from occupying the area securely.
43
 Curl, with little 
information on Zhing‟s location, went into the hills to search for him. Curl and his men 
wandered the hills for weeks, unaware they were under constant surveillance by Zhing‟s men, 
until one of the Kachins brought Curl to Zhing. Curl found Zhing sick with malaria and 
successfully treated him.
44
 The two men formed a close bond and agreed to join forces against 
the Japanese, and the arming and training of the Myhprap-Hpung, or “Lightning Force,, began in 
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earnest. Curl and Zhing‟s personal relationship, and Curl‟s respect for the indigenous culture, 
demonstrate the importance of the human element in warfare. Others in detachment also arrived 
at similar conclusions about the importance of recruiting the indigenous people. 
In February 1943, Captain William C. Wilkinson and four agents arrived in Sumprabum 
and began to contact Kachin leaders in the area. A Japanese advance on the town soon forced 
them to flee, but in April Wilkinson, operating from Fort Hertz, infiltrated Japanese lines by foot 
to establish an operating base at Ngumla, where he raised a small fighting force to harass the 
Japanese. Wilkinson, by the time of his departure in January 1944, had built a force of 700 
Kachin fighters, called the Home Guard by the Kachins, and a network of agents, one of whom 
was a general contractor to the Japanese in the Myitkyina area.
45
 Wilkinson‟s group, “Forward,” 
set up ambush positions along the roads leading north from the Japanese positions composed of 
interlocking fields of fire. Groups assigned to the Sagribum area were to drive the Japanese out 
of the Triangle, a name used to denote the Kachin hills area, by attacking their supply lines and 
prevent them from re-entering the Triangle by guarding the ferries with strategically placed 
Home Guard units. Further attacks across the Nali Hka and the M‟Mai Hka Rivers on Japanese 
positions and their supply lines prevented Japanese reentry into the area. In January 1944, Lt. 
Commander James Luce took command of group Forward, headquartered at Ngumla. When 
Luce assumed command, Forward had four trained and experienced combat groups holding the 
jungle around Ngumla and ambushing Japanese troops. By April, Forward had seven organized 
companies, with 1,100 Kachin fighters, planting land mines and denying ease of movement and 
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territory to the enemy.
 46
 Forward‟s operation can be termed a conventional mission of clearance 
and occupation of enemy territory. Forward‟s successes at establishing a secure AO in the non-
linear and non-contiguous battlefield provided a template for similar operations in the future.     
In addition to establishing the two main bases, Forward and Knothead, by the end of 
1943 Detachment 101 had infiltrated several other intelligence and operational groups into 
northern Burma. These groups established smaller AOs. Group Pat, named after its commander, 
Lieutenant “Pat” Quinn, established itself in the Myitkyina area. Quinn organized a small-armed 
force that harassed the Japanese and helped downed Allied flyers to escape. One of Pat's agents 
watched Myitkyina airfield with a telescope from a nearby hill and reported traffic directly to the 
Tenth Air Force.
47
 To the west at Taro, Group Red, under Captain Maddox of Group A, trained 
500 Kachin fighters and reconnoitered Japanese activities on the right flank of the Allied forces 
preparing for their advance into Burma. Other groups penetrated even farther behind Japanese 
lines. By December 1943, Detachment 101 had eleven radio stations reporting regularly from 
behind enemy lines.
48
 These small AOs were more mobile and seemingly guerrilla-like in their 
tactics, yet unlike guerrilla forces, they were strategically connected, supplied, and coordinated 
with the centralized command, which is standard in operations of units operating from 
noncontiguous AOs in non-linear and non-contiguous battlefields.  
The British, in an attempt to harness the existing resistance of the Kachins and other hill 
people, created an operational group called "Guerrilla Forces-Plan V," or V-Force. In August 
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1943, a V-Force team flew to Fort Hertz to establish a unit of Kachins. The unit was to be made 
up of veterans of levies under British colonial rule. Stilwell diverted to Fort Hertz eight officers 
and forty sergeants (radiomen, cryptographers, and medics) from the group of American soldiers 
already assigned to train the Chinese infantry divisions for their push into Burma. British 
planners assumed that V-Force would be successful because the Kachins would fight for the 
British because of past loyalties, and this would expand British influence over the military 
operations in Burma.
49
 Nevertheless, V-Force would prove to be a failure in furthering British 
influence in the CBI Theater.  
V-Force‟s failure can be explained by the British rejection, or ignorance, of the 4GW 
concept of an integrated and active operational effort to gain popular support through 
psychological operations, attention to civil affairs, cultural sensitivities, and humanitarian 
programs. Thomas X. Hammes convincingly posits “the 4GW operational planner must 
determine what message he wants to send, the networks available him, the types of messages 
those networks are best suited to carry, the action that will cause the network to send the 
message, and the feedback system that will tell him if the message is being received”.50 The 
British recruitment effort of V-Force was contingent on obsolete obligations, loyalties, and a 
British sense of entitlement of the Kachins‟ loyalty based on prewar colonial norms. This was the 
wrong message to send to the Kachins, because it denoted a return to the prewar status quo of a 
dependent subjection, whereas the American approach to gaining Kachin support was respect for 
cultural sensitivities, material profit for the native people, and a concern for humanitarian 
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issues.
51
 Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden attribute the success of the detachment to “the 
difference in attitude” toward the Kachins between American and British forces, basing their 
findings on interviews with detachment veterans. The veterans explained that “unlike the British, 
they did not treat them as „natives.‟ The Americans were, they said, quite natural and open with 
the Kachins, asked their advice, which was frequently badly needed, and even on occasion 
slapped them affectionately on their bare backs. The Kachins, after their initial amazement, 
reacted highly favorably to this treatment and took the Americans to their hearts.”52 The British, 
to be fair, did train the Kachins in 1942, and worked well with the Karan, Chin, and Shan. The 
British, as Robert B. Asprey cogently notes, “had nothing to offer” the Kachins but a return to 
the prewar status quo.
53
 The failure of General Wingate‟s Chindits would seem to bear this out, 
especially when compared to the detachment‟s American approach.     
In February 1943, British Major General Orde Wingate and 3,000 Chindits entered 
Burma. Wingate had developed his war-fighting theory of Long Range Penetration (LRP) while 
serving in Palestine and Ethiopia before serving in the CBI Theater. LRP advocated sending 
groups, supplied by a nonlinear LOS and with no fixed lines of communications, behind the 
enemy lines to disrupt the enemy‟s LOS and ability for active operations. The LRP groups were 
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“lightly armed and equipped troops, operating without conventional artillery, tank, and logistical 
support,” and assigned to “offensive operations deep in the jungle behind enemy lines with the 
aim of collecting intelligence, cutting enemy lines of communications, disrupting command and 
control, attacking base instillation, and diverting troops from other tasks.”54 
There were two Chindit expeditions into Burma, the first in February 1943. Their mission 
was to disrupt Japanese communications, attack outposts, and destroy bridges. The operation was 
very costly. Wingate lost a total of 818 men, and of the 2,000 who returned, 600 never recovered 
enough to fight again. Though the Chindits‟ mission was similar to the mission of Detachment 
101, the Chindits failed while the detachment succeeded. Arguably, one of the main factors for 
the Chindits‟ failure was not understanding the concept of establishing secure and fluid AOs or 
operating with a set of cultural sensitivities to obtain indigenous support.  
V-Force eventually merged its operations with Detachment 101. The detachment used 
Fort Hertz as a forward operational headquarters and supply depot and served as the link 
between the detachment‟s headquarters at Nazira and the non-contiguous AOs. Supplies, 
personnel, and prisoners went from the Nazira to the AOs, and vice versa, by air. Groups 
Forward and Knothead had to construct airstrips at their AO bases, which required the labor of 
hundreds of natives. Detachment personnel hid the airstrips by building numerous dummy 
bamboo huts, so that when seen from above the airstrips looked like an insignificant village. It 
took minutes to remove the dummy huts and make the strip ready for landing.
55
 The ability to 
land aircraft at the bases provided the detachment‟s headquarters greater command and control, a 
dependable line of supply, and the capacity for rapid reinforcements of the detachment‟s AOs. 
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The capacity to build, hide, and maintain airstrips, beyond the practical necessity of establishing 
a stable non-lineal LOS to conduct operations, also solidified and enlarged Kachin support. The 
airfields brought the Kachins, not just the Kachin fighting for the detachment, security, supplies, 
and employment.    
Keeping track of friendly occupied areas behind enemy lines is difficult, and the 
detachment‟s units were sometimes in as much danger from Allied forces as from the Japanese. 
On January 2, 1944, Curl, in response to a bombing run on Jaiwa-Ga by the U.S. Air Corps on 
January 1, sent a message to base to “tell the Air Corps to lay off Jaiwa now with their bombing 
that our forces have reoccupied it.”56 This is a dangerous but necessary part of non-linear 
combat; the very mobility that is necessary in the non-contiguous battlefield makes it difficult to 
provide flawless support. In nonlinear battle areas, sharing information between, and among, the 
AOs and headquarters is crucial. Richard S. Deakin cogently notes that in nonlinear battle areas, 
it is vital to understand the “concept of information dominance and the recognition of its role as a 
weapon in its own right”.57 The detachment, by adapting to its battle area conditions, 
demonstrated the importance of communications to the success of its mission and gave the 
dispersion, maintenance, and replacement of communication equipment top priority.   
Maintaining a fluid AO was important to Detachment 101‟s operation, as it still is in 
operations conducted in non-contiguous battle-areas. Steven L. Canby reasonably maintains that 
in a 4GW and non-contiguous battle-area, activity “should be husbanded and surged when 
situations are fluid, such as the beginning of hostilities and episodically thereafter when 
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breakthroughs make the battle once again fluid.”58 The detachment‟s units maintained numerous 
fluid AOs against the Japanese, retreating when they needed while effectively denying the main 
area of the AOs to the Japanese. The Kachins were able to fight off Japanese incursions because 
their strategically placed forward outposts had great defensive ability, and because the denseness 
of the jungle forced the Japanese to stick to narrow trails. Curl described one Myhprap-hpung 
outpost as “definitely one of the best positions covering those trails they could have had. You 
could not detect their firing positions until within five feet of them. There‟s no way in the world 
anything could come up those trails and get by them.”59 The detachment‟s strategic outposts are 
demonstrative of how low level technologies can be employed as effective force multipliers in 
the non-contiguous and 4GW battle-areas. The detachment‟s outposts added lethality to the 
intersecting fields of fire and excellent camouflage with the brilliant use of the pungi sticks, a 
sharpened stake mounted vertically in the ground. The Kachins would place pungi pits alongside 
the trails so that Japanese seeking cover would impale themselves. The Kachins also strung 
twenty-five to fifty grenades at intervals of five yards, connected by an electric wire to a 
detonator.
60
 This had the effect of turning the detachment‟s outposts, with the aid of these force 
multipliers, into fortified positions that were capable of holding off Japanese infiltration into the 
Kachin hills. If the Japanese used greater force, detachment personnel could, and did, retreat a bit 
and easily set up another strategic position nearby.  
By late 1943, the Myhprap-hpung, under Curl‟s loose command, controlled the hills 
effectively enough to establish its own headquarters, supply depot, and military outposts in the 
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group‟s AO. The area was so secure that Eifler and General William J. Donovan, the head of the 
OSS, flew into the area to inspect Knothead group‟s headquarters in December of 1943. 
Donovan, Zhing, Eifler, and Curl held a lengthy conference, and Donovan came away with the 
belief that the Kachins could contribute greatly beyond simply supplying intelligence. Donovan, 
once briefed on the methods and tactics of non-linear combat being developed by the 
detachment, believed the detachment could aid in military operations. All the Americans needed 
to do was to arm, equip, and train the Kachins and then tie their activities into the grand design 
of Allied strategy.
61
 The tactical value of the Kachin armed forces had not been figured into 
Detachment 101 operations when it was conceived, but after Donovan‟s trip, the detachment 
expanded its mission beyond simple sabotage and intelligence operations. 
In switching the detachment from a clandestine operation, which was able to secure and 
hold ground from the Japanese, into a combat force that also conducted intelligence operations, 
the replacement of Eifler by Colonel William Peers was of no small import. Eifler was crucial to 
setting up the detachment and planning its early operations, but lengthy service in theater got to 
him physically. In late 1943, Eifler received a concussion in a plane crash. According to Peers, 
Carl Eifler‟s health and mental state were deteriorating noticeably. He could not sleep, was 
nervous as a cat, would not submit to medication, as requested by the 20
th
 General Hospital at 
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Ledo, and completely disregarded all advice.
62
  The downturn in Eifler‟s physical condition 
prompted a change in command.  
At the Navy‟s insistence, Miles had a separate chain of command back to Washington, 
although Stilwell supposedly had complete authority over Miles where "necessary.” To avoid 
jurisdictional clashes with Miles, Donovan agreed to designate him as the OSS Strategic Services 
Officer (SSO) for the theater, but the understanding did not work well. Miles was determined to 
remain independent of OSS, which, in turn, increasingly saw him as a tool of the Chinese and an 
obstacle to their plans for espionage operations in China free of foreign control. At first, Stilwell 
got along well with Miles and backed operations that he thought might prove productive. 
Eventually, Stillwell came to view Miles “as a loose cannon, when (Miles) attempted to expand 
his sphere by sending liaison officers to the 14th Air Force and Lord Louis Mountbatten's new 
Southeast Asia Command”.63 After his visit to the theater in late 1943, Donovan removed Miles 
as the OSS's theater chief, relieved Eifler, and extensively reorganized OSS operations in the 
theater. Colonel John Coughlin became the new SSO, reporting directly to Stilwell and 
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possessing supervisory authority over Detachment 101, now under the command of Colonel W. 
R. Peers. Peers, who became a career Army officer, joined the Army right out of College in 1938 
and remained in the service after the war. Peers was perfect for the transition of the detachment 
emphasis from intelligence to combat operations. While mindful of the importance of the 
intelligence component of the detachment, Peers had an inkling of the military value of the 
detachment. His ability to conceptualize the detachment‟s operations in a conventional way in an 
unconventional theater was beneficial to Allied operations in the Burma Theater in 1944, when 
the detachment would play a part of the Allied offensive behind enemy lines Burma. 
 
The template makes use of feature in Word called “styles.”  A “style” is a named set of 
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Chapter 2 - A New Focus 
Wingate met with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1943 and 
extolled on his theory and the strategic benefits of Long Range Penetration operations. Smitten 
by Wingate's enthusiasm and Churchill‟s approval, Roosevelt was convinced of the feasibility of 
Wingate‟s theories and decided to create a similar group led by American officers.64 The 5307th 
Composite Unit, also known as “Merrill‟s Marauders” because of their commander General 
Frank Merrill, came into being with the mission to support the Allied counteroffensive into 
Burma. The 5307th had the assignment of outflanking the Japanese in northern Burma, ahead of 
the main Allied forces composed of conventional forces of numerous American-trained Chinese 
units under Stilwell.
65
 The main units were to plunge into the jungles and hills of northeast 
Burma and occupy the area by establishing traditional lines of communications and control. The 
operation was codenamed Galahad. Given the pyrrhic result of Wingate‟s expedition and the rate 
of loss of units conducting operations, it is hard to imagine that Galahad would have succeeded 
without the aid of the detachment‟s combat force. 
The counteroffensive into Burma coincided with what Peers in his official reports labeled 
the second phase of the detachment, which the official history of the detachment identifies as 
December 1943 to August 1944. This period marks an increasing level of military integration 
and joint operations with conventional forces. Peers, upon learning of the planned 
counteroffensive, immediately realized the need to reorganize the units under his command for 
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better command and control.
66
 Under Eifler, each unit had operated in a more or less autonomous 
and haphazard manner that reflected the need to maintain control over the different AOs. Peers 
reorganized the detachment to reflect his own ideas of military efficiency. He organized the 
detachment‟s groups in Northern Burma into four clearly delineated Areas of Operational 
Control (AOC), each under the control of an area commander. The area commander would be 
responsible for all operations and groups in his area.
67
 The four AOC‟s were: Area I (Forward) 
east of the Irrawaddy River; Area II (Pat), between the Irrawaddy River and the Kumon Range; 
Area III (Knothead, between Kumon Range and the Hukawng Valley; and Area IV (Tramp), 
from the Hukawng Valley to the Indian border.
68
 Area commanders would be communicating 
directly with their units and receiving their orders from the detachment‟s headquarters at Nazira. 
This allowed for more cohesive command and control better suited to a non-contiguous 
operational area. Included in this reorganization was the addition of V-Force personnel to the 
detachment, which brought more conventionally trained personnel into the detachment. 
In Burma, Stilwell faced the veteran Japanese 18
th
 Division and remnants of the 56
th
 and 
53
rd
 Divisions under the command of Major General Shinichi Tanaka.  Tanaka also had assorted 
army and corps units for support. Allied headquarters believed that Tanaka had between 40,000 
and 50, 000 battle-hardened troops under his command. The 28
th
 Air Regiment fielded thirty 
fighters and nine bombers, based in Rangoon, to provide air support for the Japanese forces in 
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northern Burma.
69
 The Japanese troops set up strong defensive positions in the Burmese jungles, 
each manned by forty to a hundred troops, to protect the Kamaing Road, the only motor route 
through the Hukawng Valley and the main supply line for the Japanese in Northern Burma. 
Stillwell had an estimated 55,000 combat troops to send against Tanaka, and air support provided 
by the 10
th
 United States Army Air Force composed mainly of medium bombers and a few P-
47s.
70
 Stilwell planned to send his American-trained Chinese troops, the 22
nd
 and 38
th
 Divisions, 
to attack the Japanese down the axis of the Kamaing Road, with the 5307
th
 conducting encircling 
movements to the east of the Chinese troops.
71
 The British would move east down the Burma 
railway in conjunction with the American and Chinese offensive. The counteroffensive was 
scheduled to begin in January of 1944. By late February 1944, the Chinese 22
nd
 and 38
th
 
Divisions had driven sixty miles into the Hukawng Valley, and the 5307
th
 was in position around 
Tanja Ga to begin their operations in earnest.
72
 Detachment 101 was providing effective 
intelligence to Allied headquarters, for which it was winning praise, but it appears there was no 
thought of using it for active combat operations.  
Morale is important in any military operation, but it is vital to warfare in a noncontiguous 
battle area. Stephen Krasner convincingly maintains that in non-contiguous and 4GW battle-
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areas, sometimes “success is not defined as controlling territory but in terms of the damage done   
73
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to the morale of the population.”74 Peers states that he met with Stilwell and Merrill to brief them 
on the combat aid that the detachment could provide, but it appears that Stilwell believed the 
detachment was only capable of providing intelligence. This was a logical conclusion, given the 
detachment‟s difficulties in January of 1944. 
This period demonstrates the importance of keeping the personal loyalties and confidence 
of indigenous personnel and their families through humanitarian operations. In late December of 
1943, just a few days after Donovan‟s visit, the Japanese assaulted Jaiwa. Using Kachin women 
as human shields, 150 Japanese troops easily captured Jaiwa. The Myihprap did not oppose the 
Japanese force because they did not want the women killed, and had to retreat. The Myihprap, 
who still controlled the jungle around Jaiwa, surrounded the village and harassed the Japanese, 
who were forced to retreat after three days.
75
 This attack sapped the morale of the Kachin 
fighters, and some were questioning the viability of continuing with the detachment while their 
families were vulnerable. The Kachin enthusiasm for cooperating with the Americans was 
furthered weakened because the Americans had difficulty in keeping the promises made to the 
Kachin. The Americans were supplying the Myihprap with defective equipment, missing 
airdrops, and failing to deliver on promised supplies. This caused doubt among the Kachins 
about the validity of American promises. Curl feared he would lose the goodwill and support of 
the Kachins because of these logistics failures.
76
 The ability of foreign forces to carry through on 
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promises made is essential for continuing combat operations in non-contiguous battle areas. 
Indigenous support is contingent on providing humanitarian aid and safety to the indigenous 
fighter‟s families. Therefore, even though Peers could claim that the detachment could and 
would supply valuable intelligence on the Japanese, given the detachment‟s poor morale and 
logistics deficiencies, the detachment‟s military potential in the counteroffensive was unknown 
at the start of the counteroffensive.   
Curl‟s subsequent actions to repair the trust between the Kachins and the Americans 
demonstrate the importance of maintaining personal and humanitarian relationships in nonlinear 
warfare. Curl managed to restore the morale and regain the confidence of the Kachins by 
providing medical care for the Kachin villages, supplying food to the villages, providing 
improved arms, and caring for Kachin refugees.
77
 However, the rumors among the Kachins that 
the Americans were similar to the British in their failure to keep their promises persisted into 
early February 1944 and caused a slowdown in indigenous recruitment. 
The Japanese attempted to use this period of Kachin doubt to infiltrate detachment 
operations. Kachin sympathizers recruited by the Japanese were usually apprehended quickly 
because of the goodwill Detachment 101 had by now earned with the Kachins and because of the 
unceasing efforts to aid Kachin refugees by Father Stuart, a Christian missionary beloved by the 
Kachin who attached himself to the detachment. The Japanese sent intelligence personnel to 
infiltrate the Kachins.  Five Japanese agents married Kachin women in order to monitor the 
detachment‟s operations, and in late 1943 were moderately successful. The detachment learned 
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about the Japanese infiltration and set out to apprehend the women and Japanese operatives. One 
woman was arrested in February 1944, but the others were never apprehended despite Zhing‟s 
best attempts.
78
 The Japanese attempts at rapprochement with the Kachins, plainly superficial, 
were also unsuccessful. Kachins who deserted from the Japanese made up forty percent of the 
Myihprap. The deserters most often left because of overwork and mistreatment. Curl was very 
cautious when recruiting Kachins who had deserted the Japanese, but he was practical. He and 
Zhing needed the recruits, so they accepted the deserters and monitored them until their loyalties 
were beyond suspicion. If a Kachin were found to be disloyal, the incriminated person would 
face immediate execution. Because of this harsh discipline, very few examples of betrayal are 
documented. 
With a combination of humanitarian efforts, discipline within the AO, and resumption in 
the recruitment of Kachin recruits, Knothead‟s AOs could be effectively occupied by the 
detachment, which could then contribute militarily to the coming Allied counteroffensive. 
Nevertheless, the planners of Galahad, Peers, and even Curl did not see the value of the 
detachment‟s military assistance or the ability of the detachment units to operate more efficiently 
in a noncontiguous battle-area than standard conventional forces, which measured success based 
on enemy killed and territory captured. At this point, success in combat in the CBI Theater 
depended on not only overwhelming firepower and greater lethality, but on obtaining and 
maintaining the support and participation of the indigenous population to achieve AO control. 
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On February 16, 1944, Curl, who had up to this time had been left out of the 
counteroffensive planning meetings,  received notice of the beginning of the counteroffensive 
and was ordered to provide aid to Merrill‟s troops. Curl had no practical information on troop 
movement or specific orders on which to base the detachment‟s plans for aiding the 
counteroffensive. The lack of information caused Curl to act conservatively, and he held back the 
units military assets. Zhing wanted to launch a full-scale assault on Japanese supply lines. Zhing 
told Curl that his men were tired of just waiting at the outposts for the Japanese to approach and 
were anxious to start attacking the Japanese. Curl told Zhing to tell the fighters to “wait until 
everything is set before we can strike, just to have patience and they will get plenty of action”.79  
On February 20, Curl found out the leading elements of the 5307
th
 would be reaching Naitaing 
on March 8 and that he should be there. Curl received orders that the detachment was to offer 
any assistance it could.
80
 Neither Peers nor Curl mentioned the Myihprap assisting the 5307
th
 
militarily, and there is no reason to believe that they felt that the Kachins could offer effective 
military support beyond intelligence and manual labor. But Lieutenant James L. Tilly saw the 
military potential of the Myihprap and requested permission to use his Myihprap units to launch 
raids on the Japanese, which would clear the trail for the 5307
th
. Curl refused, because he 
received orders from Stilwell not to ambush the Japanese and stay in position. Curl, believing the 
Myihprap were “trigger happy,” wanted to keep them backing check.81. 
As Stillwell moved into Northern Burma, the Japanese launched the U-Go offensive in 
northern Burma on March 6, 1944. U-Go had two aims, to pre-empt the Allies plans to retake 
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Burma and to invade India itself. The failure of multiple British offensives in the Arakan, the 
coastal region of western Burma reinforced the Japanese high command‟s low opinion of their 
opponent‟s abilities as jungle fighters. Two divisions of the Japanese 15th Army, composed of 
the 33
rd
, 15
th
, and 31
st
 divisions and commanded by General Renya Mutaguchi, crossed the 
Chindwin River and moved on Imphal. The third headed for Kohima. Disconnected from main 
Japanese supply lines and not supplied by an aerial LOS, Mutaguchi‟s troops could rely on no 
more than a month‟s supplies. Mutaguchi also was pressed for time, similar to Allied planners, 
because the monsoons would arrive in May and render offensive operations all but impossible. 
General William Slim, the commander of the British 14th Army, prepared to go on the 
offensive. The British 14
th
 Army was reorganized from the remnants of the defeated Eastern 
Indian Army, and it represented the bulk of British forces in Southeast Asia. Paradoxically, Slim 
had intelligence that indicated that, while he was planning counteroffensive operations, he had to 
plan also to receive a Japanese attack. The sector where the Japanese attacked was expected had 
poor communications and few facilities for the basing of the large numbers of troops now 
committed to the defense of India.
82
 The British remained hampered by their inability to obtain 
and maintain the support of the indigeonous people in that area. Detachment 101 was to aid the 
British in countering the Japanese offensive and then assist the ensuing British counteroffensive by 
covering the British right flank. The detachment established fluid AOs on the right flank of the 
British to screen the Japanese. Though useful to the Allied defense against the Japanese offense 
in the Arakan, Detachment 101 was not fully appreciated by British planners for its combat 
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capability beyond its value for obtaining intelligence. This misperception led to the 
underestimation of the detachment‟s combat potential and its potential value at the beginning of 
the main Allied counteroffensive.  
The detachment‟s combat debut in the Allied counteroffensive was not impressive. On 
March 5, Tilly, in charge of Group 1 of Knothead; received orders from the detachment 
headquarters at Nazira to harass and disrupt the Japanese in his area. Tilly could not comply with 
these orders immediately because his forces were too small. Two-Hundred Myihprap assigned to 
his AO were still a two-day march away. On March 9, twenty-five Myihprap reached Tilly, and 
he immediately planned an assault on the Japanese forces in the village of Salang Ga. The 
Myihprap double enveloped the village, the conventional approach to taking a village, and 
established machine gun positions around the village with interlocking fields of fire. They 
mounted two assaults on the village before the Myihprap had to withdrawal.
83
 Tilly 
unsuccessfully used conventional flanking movements to capture the village. More Myihprap 
troops reached Tilly in the following days, and he was able to secure the position. This action 
showed that the detachment did not have to function solely as a guerrilla force, but rather, the 
detachment vould adapt conventional methods for an unconventional battle-area. 
 The Japanese did not ignore the military threat posed by the detachment.  In response to 
Myihprap operations, the Japanese sent a strong force against Tilly‟s headquarters outside of 
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Saipawn Ga. The Japanese, using mortars, machine guns and rifles, attempted a frontal assault on 
the Myihprap's lines but were forced to retreat after the Myihprap perimeter held against repeated 
attacks.
84
 Tilly and the Myihprap held off four more Japanese assaults before being ordered to 
withdraw on March 15 to make way for the Allied forces advancing into the area. The Myihprap 
killed an estimated one hundred-fifty Japanese, blew up Japanese supply dumps, and burned 
Japanese trucks to block the trails, without sustaining a single casualty.
85
 The Myihprap‟s actions 
were hardly guerilla in nature, but were operationally conventional in their mission goal. They 
acted as reconnaissance and screening military assets; engaging the enemy, denying the enemy 
the ability to construct defensive fortifications, and withdraw when ordered.  Tilly‟s Myihprap 
aided Galahad‟s initial advance into Burma immensely as a highly mobile, disciplined, and well-
armed screening and reconnaissance force, and arguably made the counteroffensive a success. 
The Myihprap evolved tactical maneuvers suited for the battle-area‟s nonlinear nature to 
conduct traditional reconnaissance and screening operations. The Myihprap‟s operations kept the 
Japanese forces “bouncing” from east to west to meet the detachment‟s attacks, and the Japanese 
casualty rate increased.
86
 The Myihprap not only helped the counteroffensive by combat, for 
their operations also hurt the Japanese morale by making the Japanese feel they were surrounded 
and vulnerable. The detachment, having experienced and learned the insidious effect of a drop in 
the morale of troops in a non-contiguous battle-area are, appreciated how much decreasing 
Japanese morale could aid in defeating them.     
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The lead elements of Galahad were the part of the Allied forces that did not evolve or 
adapt to the unique nature of the battle area and were tactically grounded in the linear concept of 
Wingate‟s theories. Allied planners were operating in a Third Generational Warfare approach, 
central to the strategic conception behind Galahad‟s mission of bypassing “the enemy‟s combat 
forces and infiltrating his lines to collapse him from the rear forward. Instead of “close with and 
destroy,” the motto was “bypass and collapse.”87 Though operating behind the lines, Galahad 
was still reliant on a linear supply line, had limited self-sufficiency, and depended on larger units 
to follow up on their line-of-march to secure territory. The failure of commanders to anticipate 
and quickly adapt to the non-linear nature of combat in the Burma battle-area hindered Galahad‟s 
ability and mission. 3GW concepts in planning were also apparent on the tactical level. This is 
seen when Colonel Osborne, not knowing of the Myihprap‟s tactical adaptations and evolution, 
decided to break away a portion of his command to try to encircle Japanese forces. There can be 
no doubt if Osborne had been aware of the Myihprap‟s tactical adaptation and worked in 
conjunction with the Myihprap troops, the Japanese would have sustained a far more costly 
defeat.  
Initially, Curl did not want to release the Myihprap troops to Tilly, but upon receiving 
orders from Peers to give Tilly the troops for purely informational gathering purposes, Curl 
agreed.
88
 Tilly had orders instructing him to maintain close communications with headquarters, 
but his radio transmitter stopped working a day out on the trail. Tilly took the initiative, much to 
Curl‟s distress, but Tilly was correct to do so. Initiative is a vital component in the success of 
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military operations in the non-lineal and non-contiguous battlefield because of the fluidity and 
semi-autonomy of the AOs. Brian Drinkwine, in his study of Al Qaeda tactics and operations, 
finds that small and compact units need innovative leadership because of the decentralized unit‟s 
operations and general knowledge of the commander‟s intent. Dispersal of leadership and 
fighters across the battle area create the need for junior officers to be innovative to mount 
sustained operations in the nonlinear battle-area.
89
 The detachment‟s emphasis on encouraging 
lower command officers to act upon their personal initiative when commanding non-contiguous 
units would eventually evolve, through experiences in similar battle areas in future conflicts, to 
become established Marine Corp doctrine. “The lower commanders should make their decisions 
on the understanding of their senior officer‟s intent, the capability of his command, knowledge of 
the terrain, and disposition of the enemy in their AO, rather than passing information up the 
chain of command and waiting for orders to act.”90 Personal and bold leadership, especially 
when operating with indigenous forces and non-state forces, is essential to maintaining the 
morale of a non-linear fighting force and popular support among the indigenous people. The 
actions of Tilly, Curl, Eichler, and Quinn, along with many other of the early detachment leaders, 
are demonstrative of this. They show how combat necessities force commanders to respond to 
the battlefield condition and evolve techniques and tactics, while using available resources and 
technology to achieve victory.    
There is no evidence to show that Merrill was aware of the full significance of the 
tactical, intelligence, or logistical value the detachment could provide the 5307
th
 in its advance 
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into Burma. Curl complained of the lack of coordination between the 5307
th
 and the detachment, 
which he estimated reduced the combat effectiveness of the 5307
th
 by seventy-five percent.
91
 
Colonel Charles Hunter, the 5307
th‟s second in command, contends that Stilwell did not inform 
Merrill of the military aid the detachment could provide because Stilwell “didn‟t set much store 
by 101.”92 It would seem more likely that the military planners of the Allied offensive could not 
appreciate the importance, or combat capability, of a lightly armed force composed primarily of 
indigenous personnel in providing tactical assistance on heavily entrenched Japanese forces. 
Allied planners conceived the Burmese advance based on a conventional 3GW theories of 
maneuver and the necessity of cutting the enemy‟s supply lines with troops massed linearly and 
with clear lines of communications and control. In Burma, the forward battle areas were by 
necessity small, independent operational AOs manned by small, lightly armed units. This is 
because of the topographical realities of the battle-area and the Allied planners‟ inexperience 
with the battle-areas‟ actual terrain. The detachment evolved their strategies and tactics because 
of the knowledge gained from the indigenous people and “boots on the ground” experience with 
the topographic and combat realities of the battle-area, while Allied planners planned their 
operations based on maps. Merrill‟s force would suffer from Allied planners‟ failure to adapt. 
The detachment had evolved its tactics and strategy to operate within independent AOs, and 
applicable to conducting operations within the physical limitations and realities of the battle-
area‟s terrain, to strike with selective combat lethality and the necessity of maintaining an aerial 
line of supply. This allowed the detachment the ability to provide a decisive influence in the 
Allied counteroffensive into Burma.  
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The detachment, though handicapped by ineffective coordination with the 5307
th
 forward 
units, still managed to aid the 5307
th‟s initial phase of operations. The detachment, because of 
their intelligence on Japanese troop dispositions, attacked Japanese getting into positions to 
disrupt the 5307
th
 advance and thus reduced the Japanese capability for a counterattack.
93
 
Because of their experience working with the Kachin fighters, detachment commanders 
understood that indigenous units act more rapidly in response to localized intelligence 
information than foreign forces entering the battle-area. When Curl met with General Merrill at 
Naitang on March 8, he pressed Merrill for greater involvement of the Myihprap in the 
counteroffensive, but Merrill was dismissive and insistent that he wanted to use Curl‟s Kachins 
primarily as coolies and scouts.
94
 The reaction of Merrill is indicative of the Allied command‟s 
failure to appreciate the nonlinear nature of warfare in the Burma battle area and the military 
assistance that the indigenous fighters could afford. This again demonstrates the importance of 
understanding the importance of personal interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous 
personnel fighting together in a non-contiguous battlefield. Detachment personnel personally 
witnessed the effectiveness of the indigenous forces and formed strong personal relationships 
with them and addressed their humanitarian concerns to obtain and maintain their support.  
Curl seemed content with Merrill‟s attitude about the use of the detachment. Curl 
signaled Zhing to strengthen the southern post and ordered Tilly to suspend his aggressive 
operations. Curl, demonstrating his belief that the detachment would not have a role in the Allied 
offensive, instead of activating his best guides issued orders to get the units in readiness, as they 
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“would soon be informed” of the “time and place of meeting.” 95 Yet as the 5307th advanced, 
American troops increasingly appreciated the Myihprap‟s assistance. In addition to clearing the 
trails and combat forces, the detachment‟s association with with the Kachin helped the 5307th 
obtain scouts, laborers, and elephants for pack transport. The maps the Allies used were old and 
inaccurate, so the 5307
th
 commanders quickly learned to take no routes south of Nambum unless 
selected with prior consultation with the detachment personnel. Numerous trails along the 
5307
th‟s line of march were cleared or blazed by detachment personnel. The Myihprap protected 
the 5307
th‟s left flank during the attack on Kamaing.96 The detachment‟s usefulness, though 
unappreciated by the Allied high command, was recognized by the men of the 5307
th
. The 
crucial aid given by the detachment to the 5307
th
 demonstrates the importance of gaining and 
retaining the support of the indigenous population in military operations in non-contiguous battle 
areas even if dismissed of by centralized strategic planners. The detachment‟s attention to the 
humanitarian concerns of the Kachins assured the their support when the Allies needed it. The 
detachment demonstrated American humanitarian concerns for the Kachin by establishing a 
hospital for the Kachins, protecting the Kachins from depredations from outside forces, and 
providing for Kachin refugees. Supplying humanitarian assistance to one‟s ally is still an 
important component in the modern nonlinear battle-area.  
The detachment‟s encouraging operational success eventually caught the attention of 
General Stilwell. On March 17, Stilwell met with Peers. Stilwell stated that he would give the 
detachment “all assistance possible in the line of personnel and equipment,” and all indigenous 
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organizations working in Burma would be under the command of the detachment.
97
 This also 
included the British V-force and Major Coffey‟s Kachin Levies. Stilwell authorized the 
expansion of the detachment to approximately ten thousand men. It was clear from Stillwell's 
actions that Detachment 101 was going to expand its combat role. By May, the number of 
trained, armed, and uniformed Kachin reached two thousand. Supplies by airdrops increased 
from thirteen planeloads totaling 78,000 pounds in January of 1944 to 55 planeloads delivering 
271,000 pounds of supplies in April of 1944 alone.
98
   Peers submitted a plan to Stilwell on 
March 25, which Stilwell approved without changes. The plan called for the detachment‟s Area 
III to provide direct support to the 5307
th
, to attach two companies of 350 to 400 Kachins to the 
5307
th
, and to support H and K forces by patrolling and reconnoitering their fronts and flanks. 
Another 200 to 250 detachment personnel were to join M force, and the remaining troops were to 
stand by to protect the Nawbum area and aid the Chinese troops if necessary.
99
 The detachment‟s 
non-contiguous AOs effectively melded into the contiguous AO of the 5307
th
, and the 
detachment‟s troops could switch easily from nonlinear to linear combat. Stillwell‟s concession 
of including the detachment as a combative component in the CBI demonstrates how established 
military thinkers adopt and evolve their tactical and strategic thinking based on success. 
The ease of transition of the detachment units from non-linear to linear combat operations 
as the Allies‟ contiguous AO melded into the detachment‟s non-contiguous AOs,show the 
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detachment‟s ability to adapt and evolve to changing military needs and conditions,.100 The 
forward AOs ahead of Galahad provided scouts and firepower for the advancing Allied forces. 
This concept is similar to “rolling barrage” artillery tactics. A “rolling barrage” is a curtain of 
fire that moves along at a predetermined rate, followed closely enough by infantry to attack the 
weakened and dazed enemy.
101
 Additionally, detachment personnel in Area I set up outposts 
along the Irrawaddy River and its feeders to prevent the Japanese from using the waterway for 
reinforcements or supplies. The detachment thus became an integral part of the conventional 
Allied military force advancing into Burma, yet still retained its operational edge by constantly 
adjusting to the changing necessities of the battle area. Stilwell sent the detachment two 41-foot 
commando boats and three Piper Cub airplanes to increase its military effectiveness. He also 
significantly increased Detahcment 101‟s arms and supplies to up the unit‟s firepower for 
neutralizing Japanese lines of supply and communications. 
Peers, in anticipation of Stilwell‟s approval of his plans, decided to place “Knothead” 
under the command of Tilly. Peers also rotated other personnel out of the unit as needed. The 
detachment had many volunteers lured by the opportunity to rid the Kachin people, and 
eventually other indigenous groups, of their enemies and secure their safety and welfare. To be 
eligible and demonstrate their loyalty, the Kachins had to swear they were “willing to leave their 
families and fields and move southward when the necessity arrived.”102 Peers outlined how the 
Myihprap and Home guard would integrate with military units under the detachment‟s command 
in other AO‟s and with the conventionally trained British Kachin levy units out of Nazira 
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recently assigned to the detachment by Stillwell‟s order.103 Peers thus made his command a more 
centralized organization that could coordinate their actions with the Allied advance but still 
retain a certain amount of independence among the non-contiguous AOs.  
Peers was worried about the detachment‟s Kachin personnel moving south out of Kachin 
territory when the Allied offensive began. Peers adapted the supply system to support the Kachin 
troops on the move south while also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Kachin civilians. 
Experience and adaptation had shown Peers that the Kachin fighters, who were non-state 
volunteers and feared for their families‟ safety and way of life, were willing to fight and 
cooperate with an outside forces that could provide safety, economic advantages, cultural 
respect, and humanitarian aid. In addition to making sure the humanitarian needs of the Kachin 
volunteers‟ families were met, Peers proposed that “Zhing be paid more, and given as much 
status and money as necessary for his efforts in the recruitment of Kachins to go south.”104 The 
recruitment of the Kachins for a multiethnic military operation outside of their indigenous area 
and under foreign command was a significant break in the traditional definition of the 
detachment of a guerrilla force.  
Even as the detachment evolved to adapt to the military needs of the Allied offensive, it 
continued to aid the Allied advance on the airfield at Myitkyina. Detachment personnel in the 
“Knothead” AO performed reconnaissance for the 5307th, a distinctly non-guerilla activity.105 
Reconnaissance had traditionally been the purview of the horse cavalry or light infantry. After 
the First World War, the United States mechanized its cavalry force for reconnaissance and 
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screening. The American mechanized cavalry could not provide effective reconnaissance and 
screening because of the battle-area‟s terrain, so the detachment provided those services for the 
5307
th
. For example, at Mupaw Ga, during the push on to Khuri, the 5307
th
 found that a group 
Myihprap had captured a strategic roadblock on the high ground overlooking the trail to Auche. 
The Americans relieved the Myihprap on guard, and the Myihprap proceeded to clear the trail for 
the 5307
th
. This allowed for a rapid Allied advance to Auche.
106
  
The detachment also filled manpower shortfalls of the 5307
th
 at vulnerable areas. On 
March 29, the Second Battalion of the 5307
th
 found itself under siege at Maggot Hill (Nphum 
Ga), a siege that would last eleven days. Fifty-four Myihprap worked their way in to the besieged 
battalion and participated in the defense against repeated Japanese assaults. Detachment fighters 
conducted harassing attacks on the besieging Japanese and cut Japanese supply lines.
107
 The 
Myihprap attached some troops to the 5307‟s Third Battalion while it was en route to relieve the 
besieged Second Battalion. Thisreserved enough First and Third Battalion manpower to attack a 
weak section of the Japanese lines and break through to the Second Battalion with a minimum of 
loss.
108
 At the siege of Nphum Ga, the 5307
th
 lost 57 killed, 302 wounded, and 378 stricken with 
dysentery. The losses of the Second Battalion‟s, renamed force M, were replaced with 200 
Kachins recruited from “Knothead.”109 These Kachins were the recruits who swore they were 
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“willing to leave their families and fields and move southward when the necessity arrived”110  
with the detachment. Detachment Kachins integrated seamlessly into the conventional troops of 
the 5307
th
, now under Colonel Charles Hunter, who had assumed command when Merrill had a 
heart attack on March 31.
111
 Not only did they bring their experience, adaptations and 
evolutionary tactics in a non-linear battle-area, the Kachins‟ involvement in the siege, and in its 
relief, demonstrates their ability to adapt to the more conventional nature of combat operations in 
the battle-area while maintaining 4GW warfare capabilities. 
The Chinese forces in Burma did not obtain the detachment‟s full support. With great 
reluctance, the detachment attached some units to the Chinese forces under General Sun Li-Jen 
to perform reconnaissance for their drive on Kamaing.
112
 However, the Kachins did not like or 
trust the Chinese and so did not perform as enthusiastically as they did with the Americans. Field 
Marshal Viscount Slim noted that in the retreat from Burma in April and May 1942, Chinese 
troops fleeing north through the Mogaung and Hukawng Valleys had looted Kachin villages with 
“no law and little mercy.”113 Thus, the Kachins disliked and feared the Chinese at least as much 
as the Japanese, and any cooperation between the two peoples had to come from American 
insistence.
114
 During the offensive in the summer of 1944, a Kachin battalion of the detachment 
had crossed into China to retaliate for the looting. This placed the American commanders of the 
detachment into the role of peacekeepers. Peers resisted Chiang Kai Shek‟s demands to turn over 
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the Kachins to his Chinese for punishment, and Donovan supported him.
115
 Peers and Donovan 
understood the importance of retaining the support of non-state indigenous fighters, which 
stronglyinfluenced their military and humanitarian decisions. If they had turned over the Kachins 
to the Chinese, a crisis of morale might have occurred, perhaps causing the Kachin to withdraw 
their support and desert. As Hammes notes, in non-contiguous and 4GW battle-areas “it is easier 
for stateless entities (tribes, clans, businesses, criminal groups, etc.) to change sides than nation 
states or national groups… non-state entities get involved only for their needs, and if the needs 
change, they can easily shift loyalties.”116  
By April, lead units of Galahad had advanced into Forward‟s AO, which was under the 
command of Lieutenant Commander James Luce.  Luce was originally a doctor in the navy, and 
had been recruited to provide medical care to the detachment. Luce built a modern facility and 
“commendably administered a 50 bed Detachment hospital in Chabus, Assam.”117 Supplying 
medical care to indigenous fighters and their dependents proved to be an important factor in 
maintaining the fighters‟ combat readiness. Luce transferred to “Forward” in November of 1943 
and built up a lot of good will among the Kachin of the lower Hukawng Valley because of the 
care he gave to the Kachin refugees. Bill Wilkinson, the original commander of “Forward,” 
recommended Luce assume command when Wilkinson was ordered to return to Nazira. 
Wilkerson said of Luce, “Although he is a doctor, he acts more like an infantry officer. Since he 
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has been here he has quickly grasped the situation, and is completely familiar with my plans and 
operations.”118 In April, Luce commanded a fighting force of 1100 men, divided into seven 
companies, which controlled large areas in the southern Kachin hills. Luce‟s success 
demonstrates Emily Spencer‟s argument on winning in a nonlinear and 4GW conflict. Spencer 
observes, “[U]nits must be capable of a wide range of activities from humanitarian assistance, to 
peacekeeping, to war fighting. Moreover, leaders must be intellectually agile and adaptive so 
they can use innovative tactics and approaches to accomplish the higher intent of the mission.”119 
Luce gained and maintained the support of the Kachins through his humanitarian work and was 
able to harness that support for military operations. Luce‟s Kachins aided the Allied 
counteroffensive by providing reconnaissance, conducting screening operations, and securing the 
flanks of the 5307
th
. 
When the detachment‟s AOs started to merge as the Japanese retreated out of the hills, 
detachment units reestablished non-contiguous AO deeper in Japanese-occupied Burma. In 
moving the Detachment unit‟s AO in conjunction with main Allied forces advances, the 
detachment provided a vital conventional military need that was missing in planning for combat 
in the Burmese theater, reconnaissance and screening. Although supported by some armor 
elements, United States reconnaissance units in the theater consisted of unarmored jeeps and 
lightly armored wheeled scout cars.
120
 American mechanized reconnaissance units, because of 
dense jungle and limited transportation infrastructure, were unsuited for operations in large parts 
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of the Burma theater. Forward‟s units adapted to perform the cavalry‟s traditional missions. 
Detachment units and cavalry share the characteristics of mobility, firepower, and shock action, 
utilized at decisive times and places to sway the course of battle. Similarly, cavalry and 
detachment units had flexibility and daring, making them the force of choice for reconnaissance 
and screening.
121
 The detachment‟s units had evolved to fill the void created by cavalry‟s 
inability to operate effectively in Burma..    
As the detachment‟s military activities increased, its focus on its intelligence mission 
seemingly decreased. In April 1944, Peers wrote Donovan that the intelligence gathering had 
become secondary to the “sharp increase in the actual combat functions of our patrols.”122 
However, for two reasons this was only a temporary lull in the detachment‟s intelligence 
gathering. First, in April of 1944, a forward intelligence and liaison section began operating at 
Combat Headquarters, at Shadzup, in anticipation of the Myitkyina assault. This caused a 
bottleneck of intelligence gathering. Ironically, the purpose of setting up this section was to 
increase the efficiency of the flow of intelligence to Combat Headquarters from groups in contact 
with the Japanese.
123
 Secondly, the focus of both military and intelligence operations was the 
capture of Myitkyina Airfield, and the detachment concentrated its efforts on that goal. Because 
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the detachment intelligence was so concentrated, it appeared that detachment‟s intelligence was 
less wide ranging, compared to earlier, when intelligence reports from the detachment covered 
more of the theater. Therefore, the detachment‟s units assumed more combat missions but still 
provided intelligence. This again demonstrates the ability of the detachment, especially the 
leadership, to adapt to the needs of combat and evolve their tactics. 
While a large percentage of Knothead‟s personnel were conducting reconnaissance and 
screening operations, a majority of Foreward‟s units were engaged in diverting actions. The 
detachment‟s units captured Wahawng, Sadon, and several other towns of lesser importance. The 
Japanese diverted more than five hundred troops, originally allocated for the attack on forward 
units of Galahad, to attack the detachment‟s units to alleviate the threat they posed. This allowed 
Galahad to advance to the Myitkyina airfield with less resistance from the Japanese.
124
 
Detachment units, attached to Forward, also provided Galahad with a flanking guard.
125
 
Concepts such as flanking guard, screening, reconnaissance, and disrupting lines of supply, 
which were the missions assigned to Forward‟s unit, were not guerrilla operations but rather 
missions that were traditionally the purview of cavalry or armor units in 3GW. In Burma, these 
missions fell to the indigenous forces operating under Detachment 101, because of the nonlinear 
and 4GW nature of the battle-area that the detachment had to adapt to and evolve to be effective.  
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Chapter 3 - Jinghpaw Rangers 
By the time Stilwell was ready to strike at Myitkyina, the men of the 5307
th
 were in poor 
condition. The 5307
th
 had marched 500 miles in tough terrain and lost 700 men, the survivors 
were malnourished, and most also suffered from dysentery and fever. The 5307
th‟s total strength 
at the beginning of operations was 2,997 officers and men; taking away rear echelon personnel, 
the total of fighters shrinks to 2,750. When the 5307
th
 reached Myitkyina Airfield, there were 
only 1,310 Americans left. Between May 17 and June 1, a majority of the Americans, most with 
jungle-borne diseases, had to be taken to rear area hospitals.
126
 Detachment personnel were an 
important component on the final drive towards Myitkyina because they replaced those 
evacuated members of the 5307
th
. Three hundred Kachin fighters joined M force, and a large 
number of Myihprap veterans joined H and K forces, which was the result of the reorganization 
of 5307
th
 Second Battalion.
127
 The 5307
th
 also employed many indigenous scouts and coolies not 
attached to Detachment 101. In late April 1944, K Force and H Force started for the airfield at 
Myitkyina, with the rest of 5307
th
 following a few days behind. H Force spearheaded the attack 
on the airfield, and K force left the line of march for a diversionary attack on Tigkrukawng. This 
was the beginning of the final evolution of the detachment‟s units into a more conventional 
military force, though composed of stateless fighters who were mercenarily motivated. 
Detachment personnel, because of their combat experience and knowledge of the terrain, 
assumed important positions in the Galahad units they joined. Indigenous soldiers are important 
to friendly combat units in a non-contiguous battle-area, but their importance is not limited to 
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combat. Indigenous soldiers‟ knowledge of the terrain and population and the ability to garner 
the support of non-combatants indigenous people contribute to successful operations in non-
contiguous battle-areas. An example of this was H Force‟s approach to the Myitkyina airstrip. 
Leading H force was 14-year-old N‟Naw Yang Nau, who picked out little known trails that 
skirted Japanese patrol positions, and in effect, assumed control over the attack route. On the 
trail, Nau was bitten by a venomous snake, which for a time threatened the entire mission. His 
foot swelled until it was impossible to walk. Nau persuaded Hunter to allow him to continue on 
horseback, and Nau led the columns right to the edge of the airstrip without detection by the 
numerous Japanese patrols.
128
 H force bivouacked and waited for the rest of Galahad to assume 
their positions. Nau demonstrates, again, the importance of obtaining the aid of indigenous 
people in the battle-area. It is doubtful that American troops would have been able to approach 
the airfield and evade the Japanese with so few casualties.   
Detachment participation was essential to capturing the Myitkyina Airfield. Hunter wrote 
to Peers, “Thanks to your people for a swell job. Could not have succeeded without them.”129 
Capturing the airfield was an illusionary victory, however. Stilwell wanted the Chinese to have 
the credit for the town‟s capture, but the Chinese attack failed. The two Chinese columns, 
because of a lack of intelligence and operating in the fog of war, mistook each other for Japanese 
units and attacked each other, nearly decimating one another. The Chinese confusion allowed 
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time for the outnumbered Japanese to receive reinforcements. Only 300 Japanese troops were in 
the city on May 18, but by the end of May, there were more than 2,500.
130
 The Chinese forces 
never obtained the full support of the indigenous population for either military or intelligence 
purposes, and that likely contributed to the Chinese military fiasco and confusion. The Allied 
forces that started their siege on Myitkyina, which would last a little under three months, 
contained a large percentage of detachment personnel.  
During the siege of Myitkyina, the detachment aided the Allies by setting up AOs south 
and east of the area. The detachment constructed ambush points into the area, isolating the 
Japanese remaining in Myitkyina. Detachment AOs disrupted Japanese supply lines, which 
caused the Japanese chronic logistical difficulties and hampering their operational proficiency. 
The detachment‟s secure and non-contiguous AOs, operating in conjunction with each other and 
the main Allied command, stopped Japanese supplies and troops from leaving or entering the 
encircled town. As the supply situation worsened, small groups of Japanese soldiers tried to 
leave by following the trail to the river or going along land trails. On the river and trails, the 
detachment decimated the fleeing Japanese. The detachment killed approximately 300 Japanese 
troops trying to escape via the river and another 300 on the trails and roads leaving Myitkyina.
131
 
Detachment group Pat‟s commander, Pete Joost, received permission to set up positions eighty 
miles south of Myitkyina, at Sima, where 400 Japanese had escaped the initial detachment AOs 
around Myitkyina. Joost‟s unit slaughtered the Japanese. On August 2, Colonel Maruyama, 
Japanese commander at Myitkyina, and the remainder of his men broke out of the siege of 
Myitkyina and tried to flee to Bhamo. Detachment personnel assaulted the Japanese fleeing 
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through their AOs. Maruyama managed to reach Bhamo with between fifty and a hundred 
troops.
132
 Other units in the theater adapted the detachment methods and tactics because of their 
success. 
General William Slim, the British commander in Burma, having learned the lessons of 
the failure of the Chindits‟ 1943 expedition, discarded Wingate‟s idea of using the Chindits 
opposing the Japanese 16
th
 Division along the Indian border. Slim reorganized the Chindits to 
use the detachment‟s method of relying on indigenous forces to establish and maintain fluid 
AOs. The revised Chindit strategy called for series of “strongholds” emplaced ahead of the main 
British linear position. The Chindit strategy reflected the AO concept developed by the 
detachment; the “strongholds” would be in close communication with headquarters and 
coordinate their operations with the larger British units advancing and supplied by air. The 
“strongholds” would send out columns to block Japanese communications, harass the enemy‟s 
rear, and aid in the Allied advance.
133
 The success of a unit that adapts and evolves tactics and 
strategies to overcome enemy forces in a certain battle-area, and the technology readily 
available, inspires other units to adopt those tactics and strategies in the hope of replicating that 
success. These other units may further adapt the tactics and strategies to suit its needs, thereby 
evolving new tactics and strategies.  
The use of “forward bases” was not new in conventional warfare; there had always been 
lead elements in front of the bulk of an army on a contiguous battlefield. However, the non-
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contiguous nature of the battlefield modifies the space between these linear lead elements 
entering into an independent AO. The concept of “forward bases” and independent AOs would 
be the conceptional basis for Fire Support Bases (FSB), which became a dominant element in 
ground maneuver during the Vietnam War. Initially the FSB was to be a mobile AO similar to 
the detachment‟s AOs, but the firebases in Vietnam morphed into semi-permanent and more 
sophisticated fortresses reminiscent of medieval castles because of sustained enemy 
counterattacks and bombardments.
134
 As one sees the evolution of independent AO combat, the 
more it resembles modern conventional warfare that is not constrained by linear logistical 
barriers. The idea of a surrounded fortress that can defend its area of operations and raid 
opponent‟s bases, in coordination with a grand strategic objective, is an old concept that is 
adapted to situations where it is needed and discarded where not needed.  
Between the Myitkyina-Mandalay-Rangoon railway and the 14th British Army lay a 250-
mile gap that contained a series of north-south corridors. Those corridors provided natural 
approaches to the Ledo Road and had to be secured against Japanese encroachment. The Allies 
could not spare troops to accomplish this, so the job fell to the detachment. Peers initially 
dispatched a small force, ten Kachins under the command Lieutenant Charles Steel and Captain 
Joost. At first they operated out of the Chindits‟ stronghold of “Broadway.”  Joost, Steel, and 
their men were to patrol the area and go into the Kachin villages to identify and eliminate pro-
Japanese Kachin collaborators.
135
 With the hills secure, Steel and Joost were able to recruit 
locally, and the new recruits eventually formed Group 10. Group 10 formed the sub-groups 
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“Mates,” “Adams,” “Barnes,” and “Davis.” Group 10 deployed on a 75-mile front from near 
Myamyo on the west to Ke-his Mansam on the east and from reinforced strategic positions 
screened against the Japanese. 
136
 These groups not only provided intelligence but also secured 
the western Kachin Hills. The subunits also conducted attacks on Japanese supply lines and 
providing a flank guard for the British left.
137
 The operations of Group 10, building on the 
detachment‟s earlier success, foreshadowed the “hearts and minds” strategy, which seeks to 
involve the indigenous people to rebuild their basic societal and cultural infrastructure, assist 
economic advancement, and provide security for the rebuilding of the indigenous people‟s 
society. The application of the “hearts and minds” strategy by the detachment secured the Allies 
flanks, lowered troop demands on the Allies, and secured territory from enemy encroachment at 
a minimal military cost, all of which demonstrates the importance of humanitarian concerns in 
non-contiguous warfare.   
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Chapter 4 – The Final Phase 
As Myitkyina fell and the Japanese offensive against India failed, the detachment turned 
its focus beyond the Kachin hills. By August of 1944, the detachment had deployed in multiple 
non-contiguous AOs south of the Kachin hills. Area III, known as Red, under the command of 
Major Red Maddox increased its force to two thousand to secure the gap between the Chindwin 
and Irrawaddy Rivers. Red unit‟s chief mission, at its inception, was to train the Kachins and 
other indigenous people, to deny the Japanese forces control around Lonkin and to protect the 
right flank of the continuing Allied offensive into Burma.
138
 The detachment‟s units organized 
into units of 400 to 500 men each, with the village of Mansi serving as the main base.
139
 Red‟s 
units were to provide flank protection to the British drive south along the Burma Railway and 
coordinated patrols with the British along the Chindwin River. The detachment‟s units held an 
increasingly conventional linear front; the detachment held off a strong Japanese assault on the 
village of Alegyun and secured the area as Japanese forces retreated.
140
  If the detachment forces 
were following guerilla warfare tactics, they would have withdrawn from the battle area and let 
the Allied conventional forces take over combat operations. Red‟s operations show that the 
detachment units were assuming a more conventional mission as line troops in an increasingly 
linear and contiguous battlefield. The nature of combat changed in the battle-area as the terrain 
changed, and the detachment‟s forces adapted.  
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Area II established AOs south of Myitkyina under the command of Captain Larry Grimm 
and fielded six units, varying from one hundred to four hundred men. A coordinated offensive by 
Area II groups cleared out Japanese positions around Katha, put blocks on rivers, roads and 
trails, and thus isolated the villages in the AOs. When the British 36
th
 Division entered Katha, 
they encountered little opposition.
141
 Joost, commander of Area III southeast of Bhamo, joined 
with Major Lazum Tang of the 2
nd
 Battalion of the Burma Army, a group of Burmese 
nationalists whodeclared Burmese independence and based in the Sinlum Hills east of Bhamo, 
and recruited the largest Detachment formation by the fall of 1944. Together, Joost and Tang 
recruited, equipped, and trained two battalions of 1000 men and had three more battalions in 
training. By mid-December, Joost and Tang commanded a force of 4,000 Kachin fighters around 
the Bhamo area. The force under Joost and Tang were to provide flank protection for Allied 
troops advancing on Bhamo.
142
  The 1
st
 Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Dan 
Muternich patrolled south of the Burma Road.  The 2
nd
 Battalion, under Lieutenants Tom 
Chamales and Alvin Freudenberg, patrolled east along Galahad‟s line of march143  These 
operations are further examples of how the detachment‟s evolution from a reconnaissance 
operations to frontline infantry troops in Burma proceeded. As the size of the detachment grew, 
the larger the AOs grew, rendering the detachment‟s operations an increasingly linear and 
conventional nature.  
The detachment developed the strategy of operating groups out of established fortified 
AOs and expanding territorial control via the enlargement of the AOs. As the detachment 
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recruited more indigenous personnel, the detachment units grew large enough to conduct “clear 
and seize” operations against the Japanese. Increasingly, the Japanese forces sustained greater 
numbers of casualties while the Detachment‟s units suffered relatively light casualties. James C. 
Ward‟s examination of the official records documents that the detachment killed 5,428 Japanese, 
wounded 10,000, and captured 78 prisoners. The detachment lost 27 Americans, 338 indigenous 
personnel, and 40 espionage agents killed.
144
 From its fortified AOs, the detachment units under 
Tang and Joost continually harassed Japanese troops on the roads leading to Bhamo and raided 
outlying Japanese outposts. “Detachment forces effectively cut Japanese communications, and 
the Japanese were forced to evacuate Bhamo on 15 December.”145 The detachment‟s actions are 
representative of a 3GW approach to combat, showing the evolution of the detachment 
adaptations to the realities of the battle-area. Yet the detachment retained 4GW concepts, using 
stateless indigenous forces to rout the enemy using support among the population. Joost and 
Tang conducted a siege of sorts on Bhamo, which isolated the Japanese forces and forced them 
to retreat. Besides conducting conventional operations with its own forces, the detachment was 
still providing personnel to other Allied units for reconnaissance and screening missions. 
By the fall of 1944, the detachment had grown measurably but was still undermanned 
because of its success. Peers reported being “besieged” by the requests of Allied units for 
detachment personnel for reconnaissance and screening operations. Peers assigned some units to 
other Allied commands but “felt that their absence affected the Detachment‟s field operations 
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acutely.”146  The 124th Cavalry Regiment and the 475th Infantry, known as the MARS task force, 
each received a company of Kachin fighters. The First Tank Group, the British 36
th
 Division, and 
the First and Sixth Chinese Army each received a platoon of the detachment forces. The 
detachment‟s units assigned to Allied military units performed reconnaissance and liaison. Allied 
planners learned from their experience with Galahad and continued to rely on detachment 
personnel. Though this may have been helpful to the overall campaign and helped offset the 
errors of Allied strategic planning, it adversely affected the detachment in achieving its combat 
mission. Peers sent his American officers and battle-tested indigenous fighters to other assets in 
the theater at a time when the detachment needed them for combat leadership as the organization 
grew in size and complexity, and needed to conduct battle in conventional military operations as 
the battle-area changed.  
When Stilwell authorized the detachment to expand, it consisted of 29 American officers, 
65 enlisted men, 103 agents, and 1,966 armed Kachins. By November of 1944, the Detachment 
had 400 Americans and 6,000 indigenous Burmese, mostly Kachins, under its command.
147
 A 
majority of the personnel were combat troops. For the period of June 1944 to April 1945, the 
detachment recruited 80 espionage agents and thousands of indigenous fighters.
148
 The 
detachment‟s support units and infrastructure also grew, so much so that the unit organizational 
chart was as complicated as any conventional division. The detachment‟s combat headquarters 
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moved to Myitkyina. At Nazira, the detachment‟s previous Headquarters, a 50-bed hospital, base 
communications, field photograph lab, and a training school continued to operate. The soldiers at 
the training school drilled in the basics of military training and conducted field exercises in the 
jungle to prepare for conventional combat operations in the jungle.
149
 Because of the increasingly 
multiethnic makeup of the detachment, ten camps were established and widely scattered to 
segregate the different nationalities, such as the Shan, Karin, and Burmese people. Early supply 
problems were eliminated by the implementation of a centralized operational supply system 
based in Dinjan.
150The complexity of the detachment‟s organization effectually resembled the 
American divisional organization. 
After the capture of Bhamo, the Detachment entered a new phase. The detachment left 
the hilly homeland of the Kachin and began operating in the plains of middle Burma and the 
Shan mountains. The Burmans, Shan, and Karens, who viewed the Kachins in hostile terms, 
populated this area. Detachment leaders worried that indigenous support would be hindered by 
ethnic differences and the change in terrain would nullify the detachment‟s operational 
advantages. However, a combination of Allied victories and Japanese misrule of the area enabled 
the detachment to work with the local tribes and other ethnic groups. The detachment even 
managed to recruit numerous Shan and Karen personnel, groups that were previously pro-
Japanese. A detachment agent, Betty, was sent into the Shan area to scout out the viability of 
conducting detachment operations. Betty reported that the people of the area were “ripe for 
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development of military operations."
151
 Major Lutkin was detached to the area to organize the 
detachment‟s Shan military component. A few miles north of Mandalay, a detachment unit under 
the command of Lieutenant Coussoule had Kachins and Gurkhas but depended on the Kachins 
for most of the combat because of their greater experience.
152
 This would seem to demonstrate 
that in nonlinear and 4GW battle-areas, cultural differences can be ameliorated in a popular 
effort against a hostile force but are still an important factor that has be taken in account.  
Political and societal mores change during warfare. When operating with non-state 
actors, an advantageous political and societal result is a conditional given for indigenous 
participation. In Burma, as in modern nonlinear and 4GW battle-areas, American forces adapted 
to the popular political realities of the indigenous population to garner support rather than 
yielding to the unpopular, though legal, controlling political structure. Maddox, commanding a 
consolidation of Areas II and III, led his fighters in a series of raids against Japanese 
communications to support the British Fourteenth Army's advance south. In Area I Joost's force, 
now comprising six battalions of 5,500 Kachin and Shan, harassed Japanese traffic along the 
Hsenwi-Wanting segment of the Burma Road and provided a security screen for the advance of 
the Chinese Fiftieth Division.
153
 As a victory in Burma seemed to be closer and armed 
indigenous armies occupied large areas, the Britishbegan to worry that American involvement 
with the Kachins would weaken postwar British rule. At a January 29, 1945 meeting, Donovan 
stated that the handling of the Thakin movement, the Burmese nationalist movement, would be 
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left to British Force 136, whose sole mission was to combat Burmese nationalists. Donovan 
explained that the OSS would not sponsor any political movement in Burma and the detachment 
would only conduct its intelligence and military operations.
154
 This agreement allowed the 
detachment to continue its operations in conjunction with the British Fourteenth Army while 
maintaining popular support among the indigenous population. 
The detachment aided in the capture of Lashio and Mandalay by outflanking the Japanese 
forces, cutting the Japanese supply lines, and inflicting high casualty counts. By 17 January 
1945, detachment advance patrols were clashing with Japanese outposts along the Burma Road 
north of Lashio. Around Lashio, seven detachment battalions established independent AOs to 
pressure the Japanese. North of Mandalay, approximately 2,500 detachment personnel harassed 
Japanese troops, weakening the Japanese defensive capabilities.
155
 As the numbers of the 
detachment increased and the battle shifted to the broader plain to the south, the AOs started to 
change the non-contiguous and non-linear aspects of their operations. The detachment took on an 
increasingly linear combat role. The detachment‟s reports of February 1945 noted that the 
acquisition of enemy territory facilitated the movements of several detachment battalions into 
other detachment AOs zone of operation.
156
 Reports show the detachment‟s battalion was 
successful in taking strategic locations from the Japanese, aiding the overall Allied advance into 
Burma. 
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An example of the detachment‟s adaptability to evolve as the combat situation warranted 
occurred on February 26, 1945. Four detachment companies captured and held a hilltop 
overlooking the road between Hsenwi and Lashio against an estimated 500 Japanese troops.
157
 In 
the modern battle-area forces have to adjust from combat operations in a nonlinear or 4GW 
environment to one of conventional, or 3GW, linear combat. The detachment‟s battalions 
coordinated their actions with Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), the main Allied 
command in the Burmese combat theater, but operated successfully by being able to evolve and 
adapt to its particular battle-area‟s conditions and needs. The Japanese evacuated Lashio on 7 
March, thereby allowing the Allies to link the Ledo Road to the Burma Road and reopen the land 
route to China. In these later operations, the detachment coordinated its actions in tandem with 
Allied conventional units to conduct conventional operations, or 3GW, using the period‟s 
conventional methods. The detachment, at this point, had evolved from a ragtag operation into a 
conventional military asset capable of operations in conjunction with other conventional Allied 
forces.  
Detachment 101 received orders to withdraw and inactivate once the 14th British Army 
had occupied Lashio and Mandalay, but heavy fighting in southern China changed those plans. 
General Daniel Sultan, who replaced General Stilwell as Supreme Allied Commander of 
Northern Combat Area Command, feared the newly opened supply line to China was susceptible 
to Japanese interdiction north of Lashio. His main concern was the area south of Hsipaw-
Maymyo, where the Fifty-Sixth Division, estimated to have five to six thousand Japanese troops, 
controlled the area. In addition to logistic concerns, Sultan was also apprehensive about the road 
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from Taunggyi to Kengtung, which the Japanese were using to escape to Thailand.  The bulk of 
the Chinese and American forces allocated for the CBI Theater headed to the China battle-area, 
and Sultan, in an effort to make up for Allied numerical inferiority in the Burma battle-area, 
ordered the detachment to clear out the remaining Japanese along the Taunggyi-Kengtung road 
that led to Thailand.
158
 Peers, utilizing the support and goodwill the detachment built up among 
the Kachin by its humanitarian efforts, called on the detachment‟s Kachin forces to volunteer for 
further service.  
The core of the detachment‟s military force was Kachin fighters who were hundreds of 
miles from their homeland. Chinese bandits threatened some parts of the Kachin homeland. Still 
1,500 Kachin volunteered for a final offensive to secure the Burma Road in the Allied advance to 
southern Burma. Joined by about 1,500 Karen, Gurkha, Shan, and Chinese volunteers, the 
detachment, beginning in April 1945, infiltrated into Japanese territory and harassed Japanese 
communications, particularly along the roads where Japanese troops were trying to escape to 
Thailand.
159
 The remaining Japanese were in poor condition, but their rear guards still fought 
hard from fixed positions. At Lawksawk, a battalion of the detachment under Maddox withstood 
repeated Japanese assaults before withdrawing to reorganize. The Japanese forces withered from 
the assaults, so that the detachment‟s counterattacks easily overwhelmed the Japanese defenses. 
Lawksawk was captured by the detachment on June 1, 1945. In desperate fighting at Loilem, a 
critical juncture in the Burmese road network, the detachment assaulted Japanese entrenched 
positions for ten days before the Japanese withdrew. A detachment company, under Lieutenant 
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George Albers and Bob Sweeny, mopped up and occupied Loilem.
160
 At Pangtara, the 
detachment successfully assaulted entrenched Japanese on June 8.
161
 The Kachins, despite 
limited Allied air support, suffered their heaviest losses during this phase of operations. The 
detachment fought independent operation to control of enemy territory and destroy enemy 
resistance. These were not guerilla operations but standard, conventional 3GW operations, 
demonstrating the evolutionary nature of the detachment, who adapted to guerilla, conventional 
3GW, and 4GW tactics as dictated by the changing nature of the battle-area. By mid-June, they 
had inflicted approximately twelve-hundred casualties on the Japanese and had driven them from 
the Taunggyi-Kentung region, and linked up with the British Sixty-fourth Brigade, an 
achievement for which Detachment 101 later received the Distinguished Unit Citation. This 
citation demonstrates official recognition of the detachment‟s evolution.  
American officers and men recruited, organized, and trained 3,200 Burmese 
natives entirely within enemy territory. They successfully conducted a coordinated four-
battalion offensive against important strategic objectives defended by more than 10,000 
battle-seasoned Japanese troops. Locally known as 'Kachin Rangers,' Detachment 101 
and its Kachin troops became a ruthless striking force, continually on the offensive 
against the veteran Japanese 18th and 56th divisions. Throughout the offensive, Kachin 
Rangers were equipped with nothing heavier than mortars. They relied only on air-
dropped supplies and by alternating frontal attacks with guerrilla tactics, the Kachin 
Rangers maintained constant contact with the enemy and persistently cut him down and 
demoralized him.
162
  
The detachment grew and evolved from an improvised group dedicated to espionage 
operations to a unit that was an important component of the Allied military offensive into Burma. 
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The detachment aided the Allied reconquest of Burma in a tangible way; 5,428 known Japanese 
kills, 10,000 Japanese estimated kills and seriously wounded, 75 Japanese captured, 51 bridges 
destroyed, 9 trains derailed, 277 Japanese military vehicles destroyed, 3,000 tons of Japanese 
supplies destroyed, and 700 tons of enemy supplies captured.
163
 Given Japan‟s limited manpower 
and supply, these losses seriously harmed the Japanese war effort in Burma. 
The detachment‟s military operations, far from being guerilla in nature, were a 
foreshadowing of combat in the later part of the Twentieth and the early Twenty-first centuries, 
where combat operations are commonly conducted in non-linear and non-contiguous battle-
areas. The detachment‟s experience provides an example of how the warfare is evolutionary. The 
detachment performed hold and control, reconnaissance, flanking guard, and screening 
operations for the Allied offensive into Burma. The detachment‟s actions and operations 
demonstrate the importance of evolving and adapting a viable non-linear tactical approach to 
battle in a non-contiguous battle-area. This was, and still is, possible by adapting technological 
advances that are available to obtain the ultimate goal of warfare, which is to destroy the 
enemy‟s means and will to conduct combat. This is not to suggest that the detachment‟s actions 
and success definitively confirm the evolutionary nature of combat as opposed to a revolutionary 
nature, but suggests that a closer examination of the detachment provides an example of the 
evolutionary nature of warfare.  
 
 
                                                 
163
 Peers, Behind the Burma Road, 217. 
75 
 
Bibliography 
Allen, Louis. Burma, the Longest War. New York: St. Martins Press, 1984. 
 
Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows The Guerilla in History. New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1994. 
Atkins, John L. A Model of Nonlinear and Noncontiguous Operations: The War in 
Burma 1943 – 1945. Monograph, United States Command and General Staff College, 2003. 
Accessed February 28, 2009.  http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0305atkins.pdf 
 
Bagby, Wesley Marvin. The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with China in 
World War II.  Dover: Delaware Press, 1992. 
 
 Bennett, Judith A. Natives and Exotics: World War II and Environment in the Southern 
Pacific. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009. 
 
Bidwell, Shelford. The Chindit War: The Campaign in Burma, 1944. Leicester: 
Ulverscroft, 1982. 
 
Bjorge, Gary J. Merrill’s Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma 1944. 
Washington, D.C.: Combat Studies Institute, 1996. 
 
Breen, John. “My Experiences in Detachment 101”, OSS Association Incorporated, 
Winter 1999 – 2000, 2. Accessed Feduary 24, 2009.  http://www.oss-
101.com/newsletters/Det%20101%20News%202000/101%20Det.%20Winter%202000.pdf 
 
Briscoe, Charles H, “Kachin Rangers: Allied Guerillas in World War II”, Special 
Warfare. Last Modified December, 2002. Accessed September 28,2009. 
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/archive/index.php/t-27927.html,  
 
Canby, Steven L. “SOF: An Alternative Perspective on Doctrine.” In Roles and Missions 
of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War. Edited by Richard H. Schulz Jr., 179 – 196. Darby, 
PA: Diane Publishing, 1996.  
 
76 
 
Central Intellegence Agency. “CIA World Fact Book.” Accessed January 22, 2009. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html. 
 
Chan, Won-Loy. Burma, the Untold Story. Novato: CA: Presidio Press, 1986. 
 
Curruthers, Susan Lisa, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and 
Colonial Counter-insurgencies. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1995. 
 
Deakin, Richard S. Battlespace Electronics: Network-Enabled Electronic Warfare. 
Norwood: Artech House, 2010. 
 
Downing, Wayne A. “Foreword – Challenges of the Future.” In Special Operations 
Forces: Roles and Mission in the Aftermath of the Cold War. Edited by Richard H. Schwartz Jr., 
et al. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1994.  
 
Drinkwine, Brian. Serpent in Our Garden: Al-Qu’ida and the Long War. Carlisle, PA: 
US Army War College, 2009. 
 
Dunlop, Richard. Behind Japanese Lines. New York: Rand McNally & Company, 1979. 
 
Foster, Randy E. M. and Peter Dennis. Vietnam Firebases 1965-73: American and 
Australian Forces.(New York: Osprey, 2007.. 
 
Francis, Russell. The Secret War. New York: Time-Life Books, 1981.  
 
Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21
st
 Century. St. Paul, MN: 
MBI Publishing, 2006. 
 
Heynan, Jacques M.C. Murders Without Assassins. Raleigh: Lulu Books, 2008. 
 
Hirsch, Herbert. Anti-genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide. 
Westport: Praeger Books, 2002. 
 
77 
 
Hofmann, George F.  Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. 
Cavalry.  Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006. 
 
 
Hogan, David W. Jr., US Arms Special Operations in World War II. Washington: US 
Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1992. 
 
Holmes, H. Allen. “Special Operations Forces as a Strategic Asset in the 21st Century.” In 
Roles and Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War, edited by. Richard H. Schultz, 
Robert L. Pflatzgraff, and W. Bradley Stock, 159 - 164. Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 1997.  
Hopkins, James E.T. and John M. Jones,. Spearhead: A Complete History of Merrill’s 
Marauders Rangers. Baltimore, MD: Galahad Press, 1999. 
 
Hunter, Charles N. “Galahad: Intelligence Aspects”. In  Studies in Intelligence, 5 (1961): 
1 – 27. 
 
Hunter, Charles N. Galahad. San Antionio, TX: Tlie Naylor, 1963. 
 
Johnson, David E. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U. S. Army, 1917-
1945 (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
 
Jordan, George B. “Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare.” In 
Modern Guerilla Warfare, edited by Franklin M. Osanka, 403, 407, 409. New York: Glencoe 
Free Press, 1966.  
 
Keegan, John. The Second World War. London: Penguin Books, 1990.  
 
Knight, Andy. “Civil-military Cooperation and Human Security.” In Civil-military 
Cooperation in Post-conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice, edited by Christopher 
Ankerson, 15-31, New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
78 
 
Kreis, John, “China and the Fourteenth Air Force.” In Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and 
Army Air Forces Operations in World War II. Edited by John Kreis, 319- 326. Washington, 
D.C.: Air Force History and Museums, 1996. 
 
Lin., W.S. “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare.”Military Review, 21, (2004): 9-
14. 
 
Lind, William, et al. “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine 
Corps Gazette 63 (1989): 22 -26. 
 
Locke, M.E. “Artillery in Europe.” The Field Artillery Journal 6 (1917): 294 -301 
 
McGrath, John J. Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern 
Armies. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007. 
 
Miles, Milton E. A Different Kind of War, ed. Hawthorne Daniel. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1967. 
 
Moreman, T. R. The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 
1941-45: Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare. New York: Routledge, 
2005. 
 
Moreman, Tim. Chindit 1942 -1945. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2009. 
Mortensen, Bernhardt L. “The Clean-Up.” In The Army Air Forces in World War II. 
Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 448-469. Washington D.C.: Office of Air 
Force History, 1983.  
 
Ogburn, Charlton. The Marauders. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 
 
Ohl, John Kennedy. Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in 
WWII. DeKalb, Il.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994.  
 
Peers William R and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road. Boston: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1963. 
 
79 
 
Prefer, Nathan N. Vinegar Joe’s War: Stilwell’s Campaign in Burma. Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 2000. 
 
Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1986. 
 
Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II , China-
Burma-India Theater, I:  Stilwell’s Mission to China, II:  Stilwell’s command Problems, and III: 
Time Runs Out in the CBI. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953.   
 
Roone, David. Mad Mike: A Life of Brigadier Michael Calvert and Wingate and 
Chindits: Redressing the Balance. Barnsley, U.K.: Pen and Sword Books, 2007.  
 
Rothstein, Hy S. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006. 
 
Rothwell, Victor. War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Major 
Belligerents, 1939 – 1945. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.  
 
Royle, Trevor. Orde Wingate: Irregular Soldier. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1995.   
 
Sandler, Stanley. World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia. New York: Garland 
Publishing, 2001.  
 
Sacquety, Troy.“A Special Forces Model: Detachment 101 in the Myitkyina Campaign, 
Part I.” In Veritas: Journal of Special Operations History , 4.1 (2008): 30-47.   
 
Slim, William. Defeat into Victory. London: Papermac, 1986. 
 
Spencer, Emily. The Difficult War: Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations 
Forces. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009. 
 
80 
 
Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 – 1945. New 
York: Grove Press, 1970.   
Tucker, Shelby, Among Insurgents. New York: Macmillan, 2000.  
United States Army. FM 3-0: Operations. Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 2001. 
 
U.S. Marine Corps. FM 1, Warfighting. Washington, D.C.:U.S. Marine Corp, 1989. 
 
Wakeman, Frederic. Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Ward, James C. “The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS” in The Secret War: The 
Office of Strategic Service in WWII. Edited by George C. Chalou. Washington, D.C.: National 
Archives and Records Administration, 2002. 
 
West, Barbra. Encyclopedia of the Peoples of the Asia and Oceania. New York: Infobase 
Publishing, 2009 
War Department. FM 31-20 Basic Field Manual: Jungle Warfare, December 15, 1941. 
Washington, D.C., Office of Government Printing, 1941. 
 
Zedong, Mao. Selective Works, II. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965.  
 
 
81 
 
 
Appendix A - Enter Your Appendix Title Here 
Appendices must be identified by letters (A, B, etc.) rather than by numbers.  For this 
reason, different style headings are used with appendices.  (The style at the top of this page is 
“Appendix A - Heading 6.”) 
 First-level Subhead (Heading 7 style) 
Within an appendix,  Heading 7 is the style to use for all first-level subheads. If you need 
to add another subhead level within Heading 7, use Heading 8 as shown below.   
Second-level Subhead (Heading 8 style) 
Use  Heading 8 for all second-level subheads within an appendix.  If you need to add 
another subhead level within Heading 8, use Heading 9 as shown below. 
 Third-level Subhead (Heading 9 style) 
If you need a third-level subhead in an appendix, use Heading 4. 
 Figures and Tables Within Appendices 
When you first add a figure or table to an appendix, it will be numbered as though it were 
in a regular chapter.  For example, when the figure below was first inserted, it became “Figure 
4.1”.  As a figure within Appendix A, it should be “Figure A.1”   
To make this change, the codes in the caption labels must be modified, and it‟s best to 
wait until all figures and tables have been added to appendices.  For details, see the Appendices 
section on the Using Word page (http://www.k-state.edu/grad/etdr/orient/wordindex.htm). 
  
Figure A.1 First Figure in Appendix A 
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